Sea was reached, serfdom revoked (1861), valuable deposits of coal, iron and manganese were discovered; the population increased considerably, all of which caused other national questions to recede into the background. It was only in 1900 that the first unmistakable signs of the spread of national consciousness among the broad masses began to appear. In this year the Revolutionary Ukraine Party included a demand for an independent Ukraine in its program and the Ukraine movement made great progress in the short constitutional period after 1905. Ukrainian books and reviews, the idea of national societies and unions for adult education began to spread. And yet we must admit to-day that national consciousness among the peasants was slow to awaken; the solution of social questions was felt to be more urgent.

In Galicia more progress was made. At the outbreak of World War I there was already a well-developed system of Ukrainian schools, gymnastic societies and cooperative associations built up in constant conflict with Polish officials. The Ukrainians were loyal in their feelings for Austria; they thought that the victory of the German side would bring their own national struggle immediate advantages.

Revolution and Post-War Years

When war broke out, Ukrainian divisions immediately took part voluntarily in the fighting in the Carpathians. Special camps were erected for Ukrainian prisoners of war in which Ukrainians were separated from the Russians and trained in the spirit of nationalism. In the country itself the Ukraine Central Council was formed at Kyiv after the fall of the Tsar and it demanded the right of self-government from the provisional government in St. Petersburg. This was refused and negotiations were broken off when the bolshevists finally seized power. Towards the end of 1917 Lenin sent bolshevist troops to Kyiv, whereupon the Central Council declared the independence of Ukraine on January 22nd, 1918. Now the misfortune that political power was almost exclusively in the hands of members of the socialist and democratic Left, avenged itself; for those parties had no experience in the political control of a state. No

175 steps were taken to create a national army. While the peasants
●669 were engaged in carrying out agrarian reforms, they were horrified to hear that the Central Council was planning to do away with private property altogether.

The Central Council was strengthened anew by the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. German and A·· trian troops occupied the whole of Ukraine. But soon the Utopian social policy of the Central Council led to friction with the Germans so that they furthered the coup d'état of April 29th, 1918 whereby Paul Skoropadskyj, the descendant of a former Hetman became the ruler of Ukraine. But Skoropadskyj's policy of conciliation towards conservative and military groups which were more or less indifferent with regard to national problems soon met with opposition with Ukrainian nationalists. When in November 1918 the Hetman announced the federation of the new Russian state to be established from a center in the south area, there was a general rising. The Germans left Ukraine along with the Hetman as the war had meantime drawn to a close and in December 1918 a Council of Rebels took over the government in Kyiv. It had been possible to mobilise the peasantry against Skoropadskyj because they were told that under his authority they would have to give back the land that had been taken from the nobles; but the Council was unable to devise any effective slogan against bolshevism, it being itself entirely under the influence of cosmopolitan and international theories.

So the reunion with Galicia (constituted as "West-Ukrainian Republic" after the fall of the Danube monarchy) that was proclaimed on February 22nd, 1919 in Kyiv was merely the recognition of a principle. The war on two fronts against Poland and the bolshevists overtaxed the powers of the new-born state. In February 1919 Kyiv was lost and shortly after there was only a small part of Podolia still in the Council's hands. In July the government decided to abandon the struggle against Poland and to concentrate its energy against the bolshevists. The united army of Galicia and the Eastern Ukraine beat the bolshevists and towards the end of August Kyiv was re-taken. At this point Denikin's Russian White army attacked the flank of the Ukrainians who were forced to retreat once more. Typhus decimated

the forces. Simon Petlura, who was in command, negotiated with the Poles for an alliance against Russia. All men still fit for service were organised to produce a successful guerilla attack against Denikin's lines of communication and those of the bolshevists. Late in the spring of 1920 the Ukrainians, having once more beaten the bolshevists, formed an alliance with the Poles. A counter-attack by the bolshevists resulted in a common front of Poles and Ukrainians, on the south wing of which the latter defended the Dnister line. After the "miracle on the Vistula" the Poles forgot their allies who had finally to clear out of Podolia at the end of November. 175 669

As a result of these struggles the greatest part of Ukraine became an "independent republic". In reality the country was handed over to the central bolshevist power. Moreover about 7 million Ukrainians were incorporated in Russian territory. The Ambassadors' Council of 1923 allocated Galicia to Poland and that province, as well as the neighboring provinces of Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm enjoyed all the advantages of the Polish police system for two decades. Carpathian Ukraine which in 1919 had voluntarily joined Ukraine, was annexed to Czechoslovakia after the end of the war, while Bucovina and Bessarabia fell to Roumania. In spite of this partition of Ukrainian territory the struggles of 1917-1920 cannot be regarded as a failure.

Thanks to them the Ukrainian idea has now become the possession of the entire people.

It is obvious that hard times are ahead of the Ukrainians but the end of the present situation (the whole Ukrainian territory is occupied by the Soviet Union to-day) is in sight. There is a general feeling of injustice that spurs the people's determination to utilise every opportunity of launching a campaign for the life of the national state!

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again, after the offensive of General Brusilov had broken the Austro-Hungarian Front at several points. Part of Volhynia was cleared of the enemy and the Russians again invaded Galicia, occupying Stanislavov and also Czernowitz and the whole of the Bukovina. The Front was again removed from the region of Kiev. 175

Under the influence of the Russian victories the Roumanians entered the war, but they proved to be unprepared for serious conflict. A Russian army was sent to check the German invasion in Moldavia, and a new 'Roumanian Front' was created, so that the battle-line now ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea. During the winter of 1916–17 the South-Western Front was stabilized. Headquarters were planning a new offensive in the spring against Lvov and believed in its ultimate success. Peace and quiet reigned in Kiev and in the neighbourhood of the Front. (1)

§2. HRUSHEVSKY AND VINNICHENKO: THE UKRAINIANS AT BREST-LITOVSK

When the news of the February Revolution (February according to the Old Style, March according to the New) in Petrograd reached Kiev neither the authorities nor the populace would at first credit the truth of it. However, it was not long before the events which had taken place in the northern capital were repeated in Kiev and the cities of the Ukraine. 669 208

The process of decomposition which was destroying the armies of the North-Western and Western Fronts infected somewhat later the forces on the South-Western and Roumanian Fronts. As for the Ukrainian national movement, no one thought about it during those first days of revolution. With the exception of Finland, where the revolutionary movement was accompanied by a wave of feeling in favour of national independence, in no part of the Russian Empire were nationalist aspirations the motive of the Revolution. The first impulse of the masses, irrespective of their nationality, was to look upon the Revolution as a means of ending the war which had lasted too long. The other motives which soon made themselves apparent were everywhere of a social nature.

The state of mind of the masses found expression in the institution of 'Councils (*Soviety*) of Soldiers', Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates', in the creation of which all the leading socialist groups and parties took a hand. People of all nationalities participated in these Soviets; Georgian politicians, who for a generation had played a leading role in Russian radical movements, made themselves par- 208 623

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circumstances to extract the maximum concessions from the harassed liberal leaders who could not risk a political crisis in the rear of the South-Western Army. 668 642

When the offensive ended in catastrophe with a loss of over 100,000 casualties and 47,000 prisoners, the complete demoralization of the Front and the appearance of thousands of fugitives in Kiev, the ministers of the Provisional Government had no alternative but to capitulate to the *Rada*. On 17 July, in the presence of Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, the existence of 'the General Secretariat' was proclaimed and legalized. 721 642

The disaster at the Front was followed during July by the outbreak of riots and disorders in the interior of Russia. The Soviets openly declared themselves against the Provisional Government, while the Bolshevik faction, after the arrival of Lenin, began to gain strength and made their first attempt to gain power by armed insurrection. 669●

The *Rada* began to concentrate what Ukrainian military elements it was able to attract round Kiev; two regiments, named respectively 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and 'Polubotok', were in process of formation. Both regiments consisted of undisciplined and disorderly deserters and mutineers. An attempt by the Russian Command to send the 'Ukrainian Regiments' to the Front provoked a real mutiny in the ranks of the 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment', who considered their presence in Kiev 'for the protection of the *Rada*' more necessary than in the firing line. After an encounter at the Central Railway Station at Kiev with a squadron of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, the Ukrainian troops surrendered and were deprived of their weapons. 642 669

Petrograd in the meantime was rejoicing over the suppression of the Bolshevik rising; Lenin had fled to Finland.

This success of the Provisional Government tended to calm both troubled and conspiratorial minds and, under the influence of the German offensive which had begun and which threatened both Kiev and Petrograd, the ministers of the Kerenski Government adopted a firmer attitude in their discussions with the representatives of the *Rada*, who had come to Petrograd to discuss the terms of the Statute which was to regulate the position of the Ukraine. Instead of the Statute only new 'instructions' to the General Secretariat were conceded. The territory of the Ukraine was to consist now of only five Governments: three on the right and two on the left bank of the Dniepr. The Government of Kharkov and the three New Russian Governments were excluded, although the delegates had tried to insist that, in addition to the nine Governments already claimed, Bessarabia and the greater parts of the Governments of Kursk and Voronezh should also form part of the Ukraine. 642 634

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soldiers were electing Soviets; and on the 11th that an armistice had been signed on the Western Front. 727 668

The question of the evacuation of the German troops immediately arose and it was clear that this would present enormous difficulties. Lvov was seized by Galician Ukrainians; Lublin and Warsaw by the Poles: neither were willing to let troop trains through. From Kiev only one line of railway remained: Kovel-Brest-Litovsk-Belostok.

The news of the crash of the German Front in the West and of the impending evacuation of the Ukraine by the Germans was naturally the signal for a Ukrainian movement directed against the Hetman's Government. On 20 November, during street riots in Kiev, twenty people were killed. A whole Ukrainian Division declared itself against the Hetman and began to march from Konotop on Kiev; it was stopped by German troops. Large bands of 'Reds' appeared near Kharkov. New Russia was swarming with brigands who had armed themselves with what the Austrians had left behind. This was only the beginning.

The principal politicians of the 'National Union' were also on the alert and each of them acted according to his disposition. Vinnichenko formed a 'Directoria' of five members from the different Ukrainian Socialist parties, while Petlyura hastened to Belaya Tserkov, where he easily raised a mutiny against the Hetman in the crack regiment which had been christened with the romantic name of 'The Zaporogian Sech Rifles' and which had been recruited largely out of the Russian war prisoners from Rastatt who had been given the 'special education in the Ukrainian spirit'.

§ 4. *DIE RÜCKFÜHRUNG DES OSTHEERES*

Between Petlyura and Vinnichenko dissensions immediately arose not only on questions of principle: they were personal enemies. Vinnichenko wanted the Ukraine to be proclaimed a 'State of Workers and Peasants', but not subject to Moscow. Petlyura turned out to be a politician of a more practical turn of mind: he understood well enough that it would not be long before the Moscow Soviets would swallow up Vinnichenko's Ukraine. He also understood that it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to conciliate the sympathy and interest of the Entente powers if the Ukrainian nationalists were to gain sufficient time to establish any sort of stable régime. Petlyura was not a bad organizer and his firmness made him popular with the soldiers. Therefore he was the master of the situation. 642

Partly in consequence of Petlyura's 'Universal' and partly in response to Vinnichenko's proclamations which were plastered all over 669

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669 the Ukraine—even in the streets of the Hetman's capital, but most of all because of the peasants' overwhelming desire 'to get rid of the Germans', armed groups and detachments appeared everywhere. These bodies paid no particular heed to the self-appropriated authority of the 'Directoria' but obeyed their improvised *atamans* and 'colonels'.

642 Skoropadsky could not help realizing that his position had suddenly become desperate. His cabinet was powerless in every respect, and the last hope that remained was to get into touch with the victors in the war through the leaders of the 'White' Volunteer Army to which they were according their support. General Denikin had already issued an Order to the Volunteer Army in which he proclaimed that he assumed command 'of all the forces in the South of Russia'. This Order of course was intended to apply to 'the armed forces' in the Crimea and the Ukraine, and it was inferred that the thousands of Russian officers in Kiev and Odessa were now under the command of General Denikin's unofficial representative in Kiev, General Lomnovski. A 'South Russian Centre' consisting of several conservative professors and fugitive politicians who were all hoping and working for a united Russia was set up in Kiev. The trouble was, however, that neither the officers nor the politicians were able to protect the Hetman against the rising anger of the armed peasantry. The Volunteer Army was far away in Rostov-on-Don and the northern Caucasus and the Allied forces in Roumania were no nearer to the scared remnants of Skoropadsky's class régime in Kiev. In Odessa, it is true, the French Consul Hainnot soon made his appearance as the representative of the victorious Entente. He came in touch with Prince Dolgoruki, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hetman's troops, and promised him the speedy intervention of French forces in the Ukraine. At the same time Hainnot warned the German Command in Kiev that any leniency on their part towards the mutinous Ukrainian elements, 'especially any sort of agreement with them, would not be tolerated'. Hainnot went on to threaten the Germans with reprisals 'should any arms or munitions be given to the Ukrainians or if Kiev were surrendered to them' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The French Consul, however, had no force at his disposal, and his promises and threats were made on his own initiative and on the advice of his Russian friends rather than as the result of instructions from his Government.

Skoropadsky and all the Russians in Kiev found themselves, as before, defended only by German bayonets. To make the situation still more paradoxical these German bayonets were now as a matter of fact at the disposal of the German 'Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies'

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which had been set up in Kiev and which openly sympathized with the Bolsheviks. Finally, on 28 November 1918, Skoropadsky, gambling on Hainnot's promises and on the understanding between the Entente and the Volunteer Army, issued a proclamation in which he declared the Ukraine to be a part of 'the great Russian realm'. He was too late to save either himself or the conservative interest in Kiev.

Ukrainian detachments were approaching Kiev from all sides. As early as 15–20 November all sorts of *atamans* and 'colonels' had occupied Kharkov and Poltava and even Rovno to the west of Kiev. On 19 November remnants of the army which remained loyal to the Hetman were defeated at Vasilkov by the 'Petlyurians'. Kiev would have been taken if the Germans had not been ready to defend it.

Notwithstanding the almost complete collapse of discipline among the troops of the German Occupation, some grounds for collaboration had been found between the Soldiers' Soviets and the Command. 'Only one impulse reigned among the troops, every soldier had only one thought: "Home! Home! Home!—at any price!"' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The winter had set in, snow had fallen and the horrors of Napoleon's retreat haunted the minds of the Germans. The officers had little difficulty in persuading the men that it was necessary to hold Kiev for the time being as a centre from which the evacuation could be organized.

But the defence of Kiev and other large towns and important railway junctions by the Germans was interpreted by the population as a continued support of the Hetman. By spreading its propaganda against Skoropadsky the 'Directoria' was exciting the people against the Germans; in fact the association and exploitation of the two hatreds secured the maximum number of adherents for Petlyura. The peasants had many accounts to settle with the Germans, while considerations of a material order were eloquent enough. The rumour circulated that the Germans who were leaving the Ukraine were taking away with them a lot of money and great quantities of goods. There was an overwhelming desire not to allow them to do this and to take away from them all that they had appropriated. A logical development of this train of thought was the decision to deprive the Germans of their weapons and munitions: their artillery and machine-guns, rifles, lorries, carts, horses—and finally even their warm clothing and their money.

Attacks on railway stations began in many districts with the object of preventing the evacuation of the German troops. The German Command soon realized that under such conditions it had become an utter impossibility to organize the evacuation even along the lines

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669 727 which were still available after the events in Poland: Kiev-Kovel-Brest-Litovsk (for the 20th Army Corps and the 22nd and 27th Reserve Corps); and Bakhmach-Pinsk-Brest-Litovsk (for the 1st Army Corps and the 41st Reserve Corps). It became an absolute necessity to come to an agreement with Petlyura, and such an agreement was concluded on 2 December in Kiev. An 'armistice' was arranged during the duration of which the 'Directoria' undertook to make itself responsible for the organization of transport facilities. But with all the goodwill in the world Petlyura and the members of the 'Directoria' were able to give little real assistance in that direction —and that little only in the immediate neighbourhood of Kiev. In other parts of the Ukraine the struggle against the retreating Germans continued to assume more and more violent forms. In Kharkov *ataman* Barbashev and his staff had to be arrested before the Germans could board the promised train. At the important junctions of Bakhmach and Kasatin, the gangs in control continued to refuse to allow trains to pass through *en route* for Kovel and Homel. 'It was simply by a miracle that, up to 12 December, we succeeded in despatching 126 trains' (*Rückführung*). By this time skirmishes between German detachments and the local population had spread all over the Ukraine.

The numerous Ukrainian bands in Volhynia became a real danger to the Germans. Fighting took place 'with changing luck' in Berdichev, where a Bavarian Brigade beat back successive attacks by strong 'Petlyurian' forces. At the station of Zhmerinka the 'Petlyurians' defeated two Landwehr cavalry regiments with a loss of more than 200 killed and wounded. The disorganized Germans were disarmed and driven away from the railway line in the direction of the Galician frontier. On 7–8 December hot encounters took place for the stations of Sarny, Iskorost and Birzula. The Germans took several thousands of prisoners, but it was difficult to know what to do with them for, if set free, they would join new bands and reappear in a few days.

On 6 December *pourparlers* with Petlyura were renewed, and on the 11th, at the station of Kasatin, a definite agreement was concluded. Petlyura insisted with some reason that if his troops were to obey him it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to return to its capital —Kiev. A peaceful continuation of the German evacuation could only be procured by the immediate surrender of Kiev to the Ukrainians.

642 The first consequence of the Kasatin Agreement was the resignation of the Hetman and his Government. On 14 December, after a short affair with the remaining troops of the Hetman, the ragged

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bands of the 'Directoria' under the command of Colonel Konovalets entered Kiev. In their wake, on the 19th, arrived the 'Directoria' with Petlyura and Vinnichenko at its head. 642

During the Kasatin *pourparlers* the German Command had considered it a question of honour to stipulate that the Russian officers and men who were serving the Hetman should be allowed to go free after surrendering their arms. This condition was only partly kept. Some officers, among them General Count Keller, who had tried to organize resistance in the town itself, were shot on the spot. Another five hundred officers were arrested and kept prisoners in the Kiev Museum. Later they were divided into groups and distributed among different prisons; a number of them, under pretext that they had tried to escape, faced firing squads; after 29 December those who remained alive were sent off to Germany (*Rückführung*, p. 52). 669● 727

The surrender of Kiev resulted in a change for the better in the conditions of the German evacuation. The Germans had to accept certain limitations on the disposal of military stores: the troops were allowed to take with them only machine-guns for one company in every regiment; guns for three batteries in every artillery regiment, etc. The balance had to be 'delivered to the Ukrainian Army'.

By the end of December the Command of the former *Heeresgruppe Kiev* had migrated first to Kovel and then to Brest-Litovsk. The evacuation was proceeding almost normally, although in some localities the troop trains were attacked and disarmed, and often the Germans could only secure uninterrupted passage by the payment of large sums of money. By the middle of January the bulk of the Army of Occupation had quitted the territory of the Ukraine, and was concentrated in the railway triangle: Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk-Kovel. But troops in left-bank Ukraine were still having a difficult time because the Bolsheviks had appeared there as rivals to the 'Directoria'.

On 9 November, when the first news arrived of the German Revolution, Lenin had denounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As a result, both the Ukraine of the Hetman and the Ukraine of the 'Directoria' found themselves in a state of war with the Soviets. The Bolsheviks had adherents enough in left-bank Ukraine and the industrial centres of New Russia: already in November they tried to take Poltava; at Ekaterinoslav, after the Austrians left, the Red Republic was proclaimed; and Soviets were set up in the mining towns of the Donets upon the departure of the Germans. At Kharkov the Staff of the 1st Army Corps and a certain number of German troops remained, but these could not protect the officials of the 'Directoria' when, on 3 January 1919, 8000 armed 'Reds' entered the city. The Germans in Kharkov found themselves in a parlous

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position, since they could no longer move westward owing to the state of war between the Soviets and the Ukrainians which existed all along the railway lines. There was talk about taking a south-easterly direction and going to the Don Cossacks. At last the Soviets gave permission for the Germans to go by a round-about way passing through Kursk, Orel, Polotsk. The Soviet authorities and the population of the 'Red' towns through which the Germans passed inundated the homing soldiers with propaganda and plagued them with organized 'fraternizing'. The morale of these men suffered far more than had that of their fellows from the anarchic attacks of the 'Petlyurians', and the dissolution of discipline and general demoralization reached a pitch unknown among the troops who had had to fight their way out through hundreds of miles of hostile country.

§ 5. ANARCHY IN THE UKRAINE: SIMON PETLYURA AND 'BATKO' MAKHNO

Having entered Kiev on 19 December, the 'Directoria' did not enjoy its triumph for long. Just as a year before in the anxious but not unprofitable days of Brest-Litovsk, 'Red' forces were moving on the Ukrainian capital. They were converging from three directions: through Konotop, through Poltava, and along the right bank of the Dniepr. At the same time the Poles—the most ancient enemies of Ukrainian nationality—with their own independence scarcely two months old were threatening all the western provinces.

Early in December an armed conflict had broken out between the Galician Ukrainians who wished to exercise the widely proclaimed right of self-determination and the Poles who looked upon Galicia as 'historically a Polish province'. The Poles had possessed themselves of the district of Kholm, promised once upon a time at Brest-Litovsk to the Ukrainians, and they were taking advantage of the opportunity of broadening its boundaries by infringing on the territory of the former Russian Government of Volhynia. Polish detachments had encounters, towards the middle of January, in the neighbourhood of Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynsk with 'Petlyurian' bands who until then had been more agreeably employed in holding up returning German troop-trains.

During the same weeks the 'Western Ukrainian Republic', proclaimed two months earlier in Lvov, got into a very critical position. The relatively weak Polish forces, collected in former Russian Poland after the Armistice, had now been reinforced by the highly trained and excellently disciplined army of General Haller

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formed in France out of prisoners of war who had been captured or who had deserted from the German and Austrian Armies. The armed forces at the disposal of the Polish Government now amounted to some 80,000 men. The whole of Galicia was occupied without much resistance, and after some street fighting the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' was driven out of Lvov.

The fugitive Government of this 'Republic' sought the aid of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic', and on 23 January the 'Directoria' proclaimed in solemn session 'the union' of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' with the Ukraine. But on the evening of the same day the first mounted patrols of Antonov-Ovseenko entered Kiev. The 'Directoria' surrendered its capital without a struggle and fled to Vinnitsa. This body, on which so much eloquence had been expended and which had shown always such little capacity, now went completely to pieces. When it left Vinnitsa and established itself in Rovno until the arrival of the Bolsheviks there in April, Vinnichenko used to say jokingly: 'The Directoria is a railway carriage and under that carriage is all its territory!' Petlyura, however, went to Kamenets-Podolsk, and at this point on the former Russian frontier the remnants of the Galician troops of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' concentrated after their expulsion from Lvov.

The commanders of the Bolshevik forces did not take much interest in them, since at that time they were occupied in trying to gain possession of the ports along the Black Sea coast.

An extraordinary medley of events had been taking place in Odessa. The 7th German Landwehr Division, sent there in November to take over from the absconding Austrians, was duly cut off from Kiev and found that it could not fight its way through the swarms of 'Petlyurians' who were occupying the station of Birzula. Marching was out of the question owing to the snow-storms and the horrible state of the roads. British and French warships appeared in the harbour rather later in the month, but without disembarking any troops. Encouraged by their presence, the numerous Russian and Polish ex-officers in the city formed national detachments; but on 11 December important Ukrainian forces appeared in the suburbs. The Russian and Polish detachments took refuge in the port under the protection of the Allied naval guns. A week later transports arrived and landed a corps of French troops under General Borius. Hot street fighting began, and the French, with the Russians and Poles, drove the 'Petlyurians' out of the city.

Meantime the Germans were trying to remain strictly neutral. During the previous week the bulk of the Landwehr Division had

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669 727 succeeded in getting away, but there still remained in Odessa about 1600 German troops and a battery of field artillery. The 15th Landwehr Division in Nikolaev was in the same position: it too was cut off from communication with the German Command in Kiev.

French troops were now quartered in Odessa as well as all sorts of national volunteer formations—Russian, Polish and even Roumanian. Greek troops had disembarked at Kherson. The command was vested in the French General d'Anselm, who proceeded to entrust the 15th German Landwehr Division with the maintenance of law and order in Nikolaev.

'Petlyurian' troops and all sorts of *atamans'* detachments and brigand bands had cut off the cities of the coast from the rest of the Ukraine. After the flight of the 'Directoria' from Kiev, the 'Petlyurian' Colonel Grigoriev, who had gone over to the Bolsheviks, became for a time the dominant figure in that strange hinterland of anarchy. In the second half of February all the attempts of the French and the Volunteers to drive away Grigoriev's men from the immediate vicinity of Odessa and to enlarge the zone of occupation ended in failure. During the fighting at Berezovka the French soldiers of the 156th Division showed very little taste for a conflict which they did not understand. Seven tanks which had got stuck in the New Russian mud were left on the battlefield.

This event lent courage to Grigoriev's Bolsheviks, who on 3–5 March made an attempt to attack Nikolaev and Kherson, but were beaten back by a German armoured train. On 9 March Kherson was again attacked by 'Red' forces; the Greek troops in occupation hastened to evacuate the town and embark in their ships and Kherson fell to the Soviets. On 10 March began the evacuation by sea of the 7th Landwehr Division from Odessa and of the 15th Landwehr Division from Nikolaev. In the latter city the bands of Grigoriev entered the burning suburbs while the Germans were still embarking. No one knew what fate would befall Odessa, but on 2 April General d'Anselm received orders from Paris to evacuate. *Ataman* Grigoriev then 'took Odessa'. His troops did not amount to more than 2000 men. An enormous booty of military stores fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

669 These easy triumphs in the ports of the Black Sea did not consolidate the position of the Soviets, which was becoming really critical during the months of May and June 1919. It is true that beyond the Volga the imprudent advance during the spring of Admiral Kolchak's Siberian troops had ended in the defeat of the 'White' forces; at the same time, however, the Volunteer Army

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of General Denikin had occupied the Donets coalfields and was nearing Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov, while General Wrangel was advancing into the Volga basin from the northern Caucasus and on 30 June entered Tsaritsyn. 669 ●

The Poles were taking advantage of the Russian Civil War by advancing into White Russia and Volhynia where, since April, they had been fighting with Bolshevik detachments which had been sent into the western Governments after the capture of Kiev from the 'Petlyurians'. Petlyura, also, had not exhausted his resources: his retreat into Podolia only served to renew his potentialities. At Kamenets-Podolsk, Petrushevich, 'the Dictator of Eastern Galicia', under pressure from the Poles, gave over the command of his own forces to Petlyura, and the latter now found himself at the head of about 40,000 men, of which some half were ex-soldiers of the old Austrian Army who had either come from Galicia or who were returning there from captivity in Russia. Among these former soldiers of Austria was a considerable number of officers, who were an important factor, since Petlyura's own men consisted only of armed peasants. Owing to the complete ruin of these lands and the impossibility of finding peaceful employment, service even in Petlyura's army had become a profession which at least procured food from day to day. Petlyura's troops were well armed out of the military stores which the Germans had abandoned or of which they had been deprived.

Some fighting with the Bolsheviks took place along the railway line Zhmerinka-Birzula, but what made the 'Petlyurian' campaign for ever memorable in Podolia was the extent and cruelty of their pogroms against the Jewish population. Pogroms began in January during the retreat of the 'Petlyurians' from the Kiev region when a particularly brutal slaughter took place at Belaya Tserkov. They continued in Podolia throughout the months of February, March and April, and what was probably the greatest pogrom of all time was enacted in the frontier town of Proskurov. The killings somewhat abated when the more disciplined Galician ex-soldiers became numerous in Petlyura's ranks.

All the combatants in the Civil War of 1919 took part in Jewish pogroms—the bands of the 'free' *atamans*, the 'Petlyurians', the 'White' Volunteers, the Bolsheviks and the Poles, but the 'Petlyurians' undoubtedly distinguished themselves most in this direction. According to official Jewish sources (*Ostjüdische Archiven*, Berlin) the 'Petlyurians' killed off 17,000 persons; the 'free' *atamans* 8000; the Volunteer Armies are accused of having 5000 to their score; the Soviet troops 1000; and the Polish Army several hundreds (Autumn [563]

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669 1917—April 1921). The 'Petlyurians' also occupy first place for the number of organized pogroms—493, or together with the 'free' *atamans*—852; the Volunteers follow with 233; the Soviets with 106; and the Poles with 32. How far Petlyura himself was guilty in the organization of these pogroms it is difficult to say. Arnold Margolin, himself a Jew, relates that Petlyura was extremely depressed by pogroms, and 'with tears in his eyes implored his men not to commit them'. But to persuade these 'last of the *Haydamaky*' to any moderation was no easy task.

Petlyura can scarcely be accused of having seriously favoured pogroms as part of a considered policy, since both he and the 'Directoria' were making every effort to attract the favourable attention of the representatives of the victorious Entente powers. Immediately after the Armistice a report had been addressed to Consul Hainnot, which was subsequently forwarded to General d'Anselm in Odessa and to General Berthelot, who was at that time in Jassy. This report was intended to establish the fact that the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' was a quite normal, strictly democratic, and independent state. Although the French did not hesitate to drive away the detachments of the 'Directoria' by force of arms from the vicinity of Odessa, in January 1919 they went so far as to send a representative to Kiev in the person of General Tabouis. The British, at the same time, contented themselves with the despatch to Kiev of a member of the Consular Service. Altogether the impression gained ground in Kiev that the Ukraine had been reserved as a zone of French interest, while the British were more concerned with the Caucasian area and with the Volunteer Army.

The 'Directoria' viewed the question of its representation at the Paris Peace Conference as a matter of particular importance. A Delegation was hastily formed which included the 'Western Ukrainians' of Galicia with the engineer Sidorenko at their head; the 'Directoria' was represented by their 'Foreign Minister', A. Shulgin; and the numerous Jewish population of the Ukraine had a spokesman in Arnold Margolin. This Delegation, together with others of Governments which had been formed or which had tried to form themselves out of different parts of the Russian Empire, had not been invited to Paris by anyone and was recognized by no one. The Secretary of the Ukrainian Delegation, I. Borshak, summarizing the results of the work done between January and March 1919, reported to the 'Directoria': 'All asked us for information about the Ukrainian Question, but none gave any positive answer. No one promised to recognize our independence. The usual answer was: "Wait till the Conference discusses the Russian

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the Soviets, but they had no easy task. The Volunteer Army regarded the 'Petlyurians' with scarcely less distaste than it did the Bolsheviks, while the 'Directoria' considered the 'White' movement to be monarchical and reactionary, and the Ukrainian nationalists aimed at separation rather than at federalism. The relation between the Volunteer Army and the Poles was outwardly correct, but each grudged the other success in their 'common struggle' against the Soviets. The Russians were nervous about the Polish campaign in White Russia and Volhynia; the Poles feared the resurrection of a great Russia. The Poles went so far as to hold their advance against the Red Army when this advance could have dealt a decisive blow to the Soviets at the moment of Denikin's greatest success. These dissensions, which were natural enough, in the end allowed the Bolsheviks to extricate themselves from a position which, as Trotsky relates in his memoirs, Lenin at that time regarded as hopeless.

In July the Volunteer Army occupied Ekaterinoslav; then Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa; and on the 3rd Kharkov had been taken after some fighting. Regardless of General Wrangel's proposal to halt on the line Tsaritsyn-Ekaterinoslav and to put some order into the disorganized rear, Denikin pressed the advance in a northerly direction towards Moscow and westward on Kiev. As a result his none too numerous forces were widely scattered over an enormous territory.

At the same time Petlyura had begun his advance on Kiev from the west, and this circumstance was one of the reasons for the false manœuvre undertaken by the Volunteer Army. In the end the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' came up to Kiev at the same time, and the ancient city was taken on 1 September, from the east by the 'Whites' and from the south by the Ukrainians. No good could be expected to result from this simultaneous but separate occupation of Kiev by the rival armies. *Pourparlers* did not result in an agreement. It only became clear that the Galicians were ready to come to an understanding with the 'Whites', but the 'Directoria' was jealous, and stubborn. Petlyura demanded complete independence and vast territories. In his blind hate of 'the Russian monarchists and reactionaries' he secretly appealed for help to the Poles. When in the second half of September armed conflicts between the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' broke out and the latter were driven out of Kiev towards the west, rumours of Petlyura's negotiations with the Poles set the Galician regiments against him. On 7 November the Galicians, tired of the lack of discipline and inefficiency rife among the 'Petlyurians', decided to desert their leader and to go over to the

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Volunteers in order to continue a joint struggle against the Bolsheviks and, if need be, against the Poles. 669 648

The remnants of the 'Petlyurians' went off into Podolia, where they renewed their brutal pogroms against the Jews. During the latter part of November and December they were decimated by a serious epidemic of black typhus which overtook them in the neighbourhood of Zhmerinka. 642

Having lost his army and almost alone, Petlyura betook himself to the Polish lines, where on 2 December he put his hand to a secret agreement, in the name of the 'Directoria', whereby he abandoned all claims on Galicia and 'recognized' Polish rule over Kholm, Polesia and Western Podolia—regions which were already in occupation of the Polish Army. On 24 December the 'Directoria' ceased to exist and gave over its phantom authority to a 'cabinet' formed by one Isaac Mazeppa, an ex-employee of the Union of Zemstvos.

In the meantime catastrophe had overtaken the Volunteer Army. 669 Having occupied Kiev and Chernigov during September, the 'Whites' had reached Kursk and even Orel by the end of October. Their line was now dangerously extended and the advance succumbed to a sudden flanking attack delivered to the north of Kharkov. A serious defeat at Kromy to the south-west of Orel forced them out of the whole area between Kursk and Kharkov. Their collapse was now even more rapid than their progress had been. Kiev was evacuated, and within a few weeks all the Ukraine, in circumstances which grew more perilous every day.

The Volunteer Army had never been popular among the peasantry. During the preceding three years the peasants had lived through an evil nightmare of change and upheaval. They distrusted 'the officers' army' and suspected it, not without reason, of being the instrument whereby 'the former order' would be restored. In many cases the officials hastily appointed by General Denikin had contributed to this distrust by an ill-considered restoration of the rights of property in districts which they had been sent to administer. Though the peasant had never found any benefit from 'the new order' he was stubbornly opposed to a return to 'the old ways'. This frame of mind was the principal cause of the chaos which reigned in the rear of the White Army and it was more conducive to the catastrophe of the autumn of 1919 than either the unfortunate strategy of General Denikin or the superior abilities of the Red Army chiefs.

'The struggle which in 1919 drenched the Ukraine in blood recalled by its cruelties the Cossack risings of the seventeenth

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

669 century. Thousands of peaceful citizens, principally landowners, Jews and German colonists, were ruthlessly put to death by "Petlyurians" and *atamans*. In their turn the Soviet authorities revenged themselves in the towns and villages on the hostages taken by the Bolsheviks and ordered mass executions of the bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and priests. The "Whites", too, had introduced the custom of hanging Communists' (Brégy and Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, p. 211).

The ultimate expression of rural anarchy during this grim period were the bands of armed peasants which roamed the country, slaughtering, looting and burning. Some of these bands called themselves 'Petlyurians', but most of them were acting on their own risk and peril. The *ataman* or *batko* ('father') was the head of a band consisting of several scores or several hundreds or even several thousands of armed men. The *batky* ruthlessly warred against any kind of authority, and their operations harmed the White Army most. The presence of this evil alone ought to have restrained the Volunteers from advancing too rapidly north, for as the area of occupation expanded and as little attempt was made to provide for adequate administration and policing, the number of the bands grew. Scores of important gangs were engaged in committing every kind of atrocity wherever they went. Zelony devastated the Governments of Kiev and Poltava; Angel, Poltava and Chernigov; Grigoriev chose the lower course of the Dniepr; Tyutyunnyk, the region of Cherkassy; Struk and Sokolovsky, southern Polesia; and the famous Makhno became the terror of the whole of New Russia. Some of these fellows pretended to some kind of ideology: they were adherents of 'Communism without Jews' or, like Makhno, 'Anarchists'. These 'brigands with a social background' had some remote likeness to the *Haydamaky* of the eighteenth century, but then the *Haydamaky* in their own peculiar way had faith; they put religion before everything, and 'sought justice', not only social justice but also national justice, because they were believers and fought 'for the Ukrainian people oppressed by Polish landlords'.

In the course of the year 1919 *batko* Makhno rendered great services to the Soviets by seriously embarrassing the White Armies during the height of their advance on Moscow. Makhno belonged to what was called the 'half-intelligentsia' of peasant origin and was born in the big village of Gulyay-Pole to the north of Melitopol in New Russia. In 1907 he was exiled to Siberia, where he had to do hard labour for the murder of a policeman. Returning in 1917, owing to the wide amnesty at that time granted to numerous categories of common criminals, he had been cunning enough to

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assume a deep red coloration. Makhno returned to Gulyay-Pole, not as an ex-convict but as an 'anarchist'. The times were not for discussing anarchist theories but rather for applying anarchist practice. Soon the fame of the Gulyay-Pole *ataman* and his feats spread over the steppes between Melitopol and Taganrog. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état* Makhno alternately waged war or made peace with the local Soviets. In the spring of 1919 the Bolsheviks, retreating under the pressure of Denikin's army, had the brilliant idea of providing the *batko* with arms in order that he might harass the advance of the Volunteers.

During the advance on Kharkov the rear of the White Army became a promising field for Makhno's operations. It soon became an urgent necessity to put an end to him. This was done on 5–7 June, when the Caucasian Cossack Division of General Shkuro defeated at Gulyay-Pole great bands of 'Makhnovians'. They scattered but gradually gathered again in August in the neighbourhood of Elizavetgrad. Makhno reappeared as their chief; provided arms which he had secured from Petlyura; gained new recruits, and between 26 September and 7 October undertook his astonishing raid. He moved a distance of 600 kilometres in eleven days, twice defeating detachments of 'Whites' and plundering all the villages and towns which lay on his way. He turned up once more in the vicinity of Gulyay-Pole and thousands of uprooted peasants, deserters and brigands flocked to his standard. He was soon able to take Melitopol, Berdyansk and Mariupol, to make three raids on Ekaterinoslav and even to threaten the Headquarters of General Denikin in Taganrog. Two Army Corps of the Volunteers had to be detached to contain Makhno. The 'Whites', however, did not succeed in putting an end to the 'anarchist *batko*', who proved to possess great talents as a cavalry leader and who even invented 'new steppe-war tactics' (he put all his infantry in peasant carts and transported his machine-guns in wheel-barrows).

The Red Army finally liquidated Makhno's bands in 1920 at the same time as their last campaign against Wrangel in the Crimea. Nestor Makhno himself did not perish, but turned up in Paris, where he learned to earn his livelihood in the peaceful occupation of a cinema studio *figurant*; he died a few years later.

On 20 December 1919 Kiev was evacuated by the Volunteers, and the unfortunate city, about New Year's Day, fell for a third time into the hands of the Soviets. At the end of January the Red Army occupied Nikolaev and Kherson, and on 7 February Odessa fell. A large part of the 'White' forces crossed the border into Roumania and Poland, where they were disarmed.

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Meanwhile Petlyura had not exhausted his resources. He had the skill to persuade Pilsudski that the situation in the Ukraine offered great possibilities for the re-establishment under new conditions of the ancient structure of *Rzecz Pospolita*, which should now spread to the Dniepr and the Black Sea. Petlyura for the moment refrained from raising the issue of left-bank Ukraine, but he persuaded the Polish leader that should he appear at the head of Ukrainian troops in right-bank Ukraine the whole country would rise against the Soviets. To strengthen his influence with the Poles, Petlyura succeeded in forming one Ukrainian Division under the command of Colonel Bezruchko, which was stationed on the confines of Volhynia with the Polish troops who were destined for the campaign.

In the middle of April 1920, when the Red Army was engaged against the Volunteers in the Crimea, Pilsudski concentrated between 50,000 and 60,000 men on the Volhynian border and struck suddenly at Kiev. On 7 May the Poles entered the hapless city on the Dniepr. Petlyura was following in their wake and he fixed his headquarters at Zhitomir from where, with the aid of numerous agents and a flood of proclamations, he hoped 'to mobilize all Ukrainian forces'.

Petlyura's effort was a failure. Not more than 2000 or 3000 needy vagabonds answered the call to arms. The people were utterly weary and exhausted after the events of the last three years, and they fled in terror from any kind of mobilization—'Petlyurian' or Bolshevik. Further, they were not inspired by the appeal to come forward to the aid of the Polish military authorities so suddenly established in their capital.

Pilsudski's adventure in any event had been undertaken six months too late. The Volunteers in the South of Russia were only holding the Crimea, while in the far north General Miller's front had collapsed, and General Yudenich had failed to drive home his attack from Estonia, even though it had reached the suburbs of Petrograd. At the beginning of June the Bolsheviks concentrated considerable forces to the south of Kiev while the new 'Red Mounted Army' numbering 16,000 sabres threatened the long and thinly held line of Polish communications.

On 11 June the Polish retreat began. After some hard fighting in the region of the river Teterev, Colonel Smygly-Rydz succeeded in extricating his army and retreated through Volhynia with heavy losses in men and material. 'The last of the Petlyurians' also left the territory of the Ukraine with numbers greatly reduced—not so much on account of losses in battle as of desertions.

The 'Red Mounted Army' of General Budenny invaded Galicia;

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occupied Lvov, and advanced on Warsaw through Zamość by the same route which the Cossack hordes of Khmelnytsky had followed nearly three centuries before. But the Russians were checked at the gates of Warsaw (15 August), and their subsequent retreat was almost as rapid as their advance and the preceding Polish advance and retreat had been.

On 12 October an armistice was signed, and in the following year the Peace of Riga was to stabilize conditions on the Russian borderlands for nearly twenty years. Poland retained most of the Ukrainian territory of which she had been in occupation prior to the attack on Kiev—large parts of Volhynia and Polesia as well as about half the area of White Russia. The much disputed Kholm district and all Galicia also remained in Polish hands, although the temporary occupation of these territories had only been authorized by the Paris Conference 'pending the solution of the Russian Question'. As a result of the activities of the tenacious Petlyura and the visionary politicians of the 'Directoria' the Poles received, therefore, about 150,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and about 5,000,000 Ukrainian-speaking subjects.

Simon Petlyura, like so many of the picturesque figures of the Russian Revolution, retired to Paris where, some years later, he was killed by a revolver shot in the Boulevard St Michel. The shot was fired by a young Jew named Schwartzbrod, who stated at his trial that he was taking vengeance on Petlyura for the pogroms committed by the 'Petlyurians'. (8, 9, 10)

§6. THE SOVIETS AND THE GROWTH OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

'The Ukrainian Soviet Republic' had been declared on 18 December 1918 in a proclamation of 'the Military and Revolutionary Committee of the Red Southern Army' signed by Stalin and Rakovski; the proclamation conferred all authority in 'the liberated territory' on 'the Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian peasants'. On 3 January 1919, the day on which the Red Army entered Kharkov, then still occupied by part of the 1st German Army Corps, a proclamation of 'the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' announced that all authority in the Ukraine was vested in this Committee which had 'the confidence of the working and peasant masses'. This document was signed by the President of the Committee, Manuilsky, and by the following members: Rakovski, Grinko, Zatonsky and Skrypnik. Rakovski was a professional revolutionary, a Bulgarian or Roumanian Jew by origin,

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who had always lived in the *Quartier Latin* in Paris; Zatonsky and Skrypnik were the first Ukrainian politicians to go over to the Bolsheviks.

This same Committee, on 14 February, two or three weeks after the occupation of Kiev, announced the federation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with 'the All-Russian Republic of Workers and Peasants'. Subsequently, on 9 March, 'according to the Revolutionary order' 'the First Ukrainian Congress of Soldiers', Peasants' and Workers' Delegates' was called together. This body received for approval 'the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic'. Seven months had not elapsed before nine-tenths of the territory of this first Ukrainian Soviet Republic had fallen into the hands of the Volunteer Army.

In spite of the ephemeral character of the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic it is worth considering the theoretical basis on which this state was founded, since its structure illustrates Lenin's conceptions as to the treatment of nationalities within the Communist State.

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Following the November *coup d'état* two documents were published in Russia which had an 'ideological' importance in relation to the formation of national republics. The first was a 'Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the Nations Forming Part of Russia'; it concluded as follows:

'According to the Will of the Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to adopt as a foundation for its activities in the question of nationalities the following principles:

(1) The equality and sovereign rights of all the nationalities of Russia;

(2) The right of self-determination of all these nationalities, including the right to form independent states;

(3) The abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations;

(4) The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.'

The document bears the signature of Dzhugashvili-Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, and of Ulianov-Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second document is a 'Declaration of the Rights of Oppressed Nationalities', dated 24 January 1918 and approved by the 3rd Congress of All-Russian Soviets. The setting up by this Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was based on the following principles: 'Russia is proclaimed the Republic of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. The Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a free union of free

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conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

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with the period March–November 1917. A series of interesting articles on the subject from the pen of Milyukov has been published recently in the Parisian Russian daily newspaper *Posledniya Novosti* (The Latest News), 19 March–1 April 1939. For the Ukrainian point of view see D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (1917-23), Uzhhorod, 1935; Vinnichenko, *Vozrozhdenie Natsii* (The Resurrection of a Nation), vols. I–III, Vienna, 1925.

(4) *The Ukrainians at Brest-Litovsk*

A vivid description of the course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and of the part played by the delegates of the *Rada* is given in the scholarly work of J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, London, 1938. An Appendix gives the text of the Peace Treaty with the Ukraine, and a valuable Bibliography is included.

The reminiscences of the leading personalities at Brest-Litovsk have been published in English translations: Hoffmann, *War Diaries and Other Papers*, London, 1929; Czernin, *In the World War*, London, 1919; Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk*, London, 1919; *My Life*, London, 1935.

(5) *The First 'Siege' of Kiev by the Bolsheviks*

This 'siege' continued for about ten days—from 30 January to 8 February 1918. The first Bolshevik detachments approached the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. The city is situated on the high right bank and presented a perfect target for the Red artillery. Most of the damage was done by an armoured train mounting naval guns, which destroyed, among other architectural features, the block of flats built by Professor Hrushevsky when he decided to settle in the city. When other Bolshevik detachments and the 'Ukrainian regiments' which had gone over to them appeared on the right bank, further resistance became impossible. The brunt of the defence was borne, not by the supporters of Holubovich and Vinnichenko, but by volunteer detachments consisting of officers, students and even schoolboys; many young lives were lost.

(6) *The Austro-German Occupation of the Ukraine and the Régime of Skoropadsky*

Most interesting material is revealed in the documents published by the Soviets in an anonymous book entitled *Krakh Nemetskoy Okkupatsii na Ukraine: Sbornik Dokumentov izdannykh Gosizdatom* (The Crash of the German Occupation in the Ukraine: Collection of Documents published by the State Publishing Organization), Moscow, 1936. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents which fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks after they occupied Kiev (some of the documents are reproduced in facsimile). It will be difficult, however, for the reader to agree with the deductions made by the Soviet editor. He affirms, for instance, that the Occupation troops were unable to deal with the resistance of 'the great popular masses', and that whole German divisions were employed in putting down workmen's strikes and peasant risings. These assertions are not confirmed by any document. In the documents reference is only made to the assassination of

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669] and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation. 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

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historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The northern part, appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoiding the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Vocanoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12–14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

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725 665 669 October, but a group of similar size and composition in the Novo Moskovsk-Pavlograd (Novomoskovs'k-Pavlohrad) forest east of Dniepropetrovsk was able to hold out until January, 1942.[4]

While the partisan bands in isolated shelters in the southern steppe Ukraine could not survive the first determined German attacks, those in Polessia were more fortunate. The chief areas of operation were the northern sections of the Chernigov and the Sumy *oblasts*. In the Chernigov *oblast* the partisans were led by the first secretary of the *oblast* committee of the Party, Oleksii Fedorov, a veteran of the revolutionary period. Though a hardened Communist, Fedorov had been born in the Dniepropetrovsk area and considered himself a Ukrainian.[5] He, like many other Party leaders, was temporarily swept from his territory by the rapidity of the German advance but returned in the late summer of 1941 and gathered the scattered remnants of his Party apparatus for a struggle against the Germans.[6] In the Sumy *oblast* the underground Party machinery was completely disrupted, but some of the *raion* officials succeeded in forming small partisan groups.[7]

It is clear from the preceding summary that the initial organization of the Red partisans of the Ukraine was carried out by members of the Communist Party and the Soviet state apparatus. These men were impelled both by their interest in maintaining the *status quo* and by the fear of violent death should they fall into German hands, since all "kommissars" and Communist officials were destined for execution by Hitler. Since the war, Soviet authors have admitted, and even exaggerated the role of the Party in the partisan movement, apparently because they wish to emphasize its "guiding role" in all spheres of Soviet life.[8] During the war, however, and especially in its early stages, while some attention was given to the activity of the Communist Party, an

[4] War Diary No. 2 of 213. Sicherungsdivision, Abteilung Ia, January 1–March 31, 1942, NOKW 2872 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2872); Report of Feldpolizeidirektor to Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets 103, January 9, 1942, NOKW 2911 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2911).

[5] Fedorov, p. 31.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

[7] Sidor Kovpak, *Vid Putivlia do Karpat* (From Putivl' to the Carpathians), literary ed. Ie. Herasimov (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 3 ff.

[8] E.g., in Fedorov's work cited earlier in this chapter.

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PARTISAN ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN UKRAINE

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The following set of maps is intended to present schematically the development of partisan activity in the northern Ukraine from the beginning of the German-Soviet war until the reconquest of the major part of the area by the Red Army at the end of 1943. Territorial divisions indicated, from west to east, are the *General-bezirke* Volhynia-Podolia, Zhitomir, and Kiev, and the Chernigov *oblast* of the army rear area.

The following symbols are used throughout:

Major centers of Red Partisan groups

Area in which Red partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control

Direction of major drives of Red partisans

Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Borovets' or Mel'nyk

Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Bandera

Area in which nationalist partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control

Direction of major drives of nationalist partisans

Direction of major German counterdrives

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JULY, 1941–JUNE, 1942



This map represents a number of developments which were not closely related. The nationalist Ukrainian partisan groups represented were irregular forces in the German service used to combat Red partisans, rather than insurgent partisan forces, and the area represented as controlled by them is the area in which the Germans did not install a civil administration prior to November, 1941 (the "Olevsk Republic").

- The Polis'ka Sich after it went underground in November, 1941
- Ukrainian nationalist police (Polis'ka Sich) headquarters, prior to November, 1941
- Major centers of Red partisans in winter and spring of 1942
- Chief recruiting area for Kovpak's Red partisan force in summer, 1942

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JULY-DECEMBER, 1942



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JANUARY–MAY, 1943

- Major centers of Bandera groups during the winter and early spring of 1943
- Extension of Bandera partisan activity in April and May, 1943
- Major centers of "Bul'ba" and Mel'nyk groups throughout the period
- Major centers of Red partisan activity in winter and early spring of 1943
- Additional centers of Red partisan activity in April and May, 1943
- Route of Kovpak's Red partisan band (Actually the band began its raid in November, 1942, being driven beyond the northern border of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in December, as shown on the map, but for the sake of simplicity all of the band's activities during this first period of its invasion of the "Right Bank" Ukraine have been shown on this map.)

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

JUNE–DECEMBER, 1943

- Major centers of Bandera partisan activity, May–July, 1943
- New headquarters of Bandera group in late summer and autumn, 1943
- Major Mel'nyk and "Bul'ba" bands, May–July, 1943
- Last stronghold of "Bul'ba" group before its dissolution
- Chief points of contact of Red partisan groups with nationalist groups, May–July, 1943
- Route of Kovpak's Carpathian raid
- Major areas of Kovpak's activity in Galicia, July, 1943
- Area to which remnants of Kovpak's band returned in September, 1943
- Approximate lines of combat between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, with the Roman numerals referring to dates as follows:
  - I October 1, 1943
  - II November 12, 1943
  - III December 10, 1943
  - IV February 15, 1944

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725 665 669 effort was made to give the impression that the partisans represented a spontaneous popular uprising against the foreign invader; the "common man" of the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was pictured as a patriot voluntarily assisting the Red Army to overthrow German rule.[9]

725 668* It is this aspect of the Soviet partisan movement which makes it of particular interest to this study. The partisans in the Ukraine were pictured as motivated by local patriotism, while their leaders were described as successors of Khmelnits'kyi and other legendary heroes. The primary effort in this direction centered about the person of Sidor Kovpak, who became the chieftain of the partisans of the Sumy *oblast*. Kovpak claimed to be a descendant of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. While his enemies declared he was a gypsy—the disarray of his bivouac led even admirers to compare it to a gypsy camp—it appears likely that he was of native Ukrainian origin. He was an old Communist, a veteran of the civil war of 1918–20, but was quite uneducated, and had occupied only minor posts in the Soviet hierarchy. Apparently, however, his rough and earthy manner endeared him to considerable elements of the Ukrainian population, while his evident skill in conducting his partisan operations won him respect.[10]

Kovpak's personal qualities and the fact that his band was formed on Ukrainian soil, made it possible for Soviet propagandists to give some color to their assertion that his partisan organization was a manifestation of Ukrainian patriotism. Closer examination of the groups operating in the northeastern *oblasts* casts considerable doubt on this contention. In the first place, whatever the origins of its members, Kovpak's band was almost certainly formed initially, as were the other partisan groups in 1941, of members of the ruling machine. The commissar Rudnev, said to be the real "brains" of Kovpak's band, for example, was

[9] See, for example, Timofei (Timothy) Strokach, *Partyzany Ukrainy* (The Partisans of the Ukraine) (Moscow: Ukrvydav Ts. K. KP[b]U, 1943). The title sheet of this work describes Strokach as a "deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR."

[10] On Kovpak cf. his memoir previously cited; P. Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovest'iu* (People with Clean Consciences) (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1951), pp. 39, 49, 181, 412; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 23, 1943, p. 3 (for the nature of this source see n. 15 below); V. Andreev, *Narodnaia voina: Zapiski partizana* (The People's War: Sketches of a Partisan) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), p. 228.

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Tsuman' area, Kovpak turned south. His route from that point would have taken him directly through the Kremenets centers of the Mel'nyk and Bandera bands, but again he made a detour, this time to the east, skirting the Kremenets area and entering Galicia south of Ternopol' (Tarnopil').[54] The entire march across the area of operations of the nationalist partisans—over 250 miles—took the Red force about three weeks.[55]

When Kovpak's force entered Galicia in early July, it was only partially successful in achieving its primary objective, disruption of the Drohobich petroleum production.[56] It did, however, cause a severe disturbance of the peace of Galicia. For a long time the OUN-B had been preparing an underground armed force there. When Kovpak's arrival turned the extreme eastern part of the province into a battlefield, this organization (Ukraïns'ka Narodna Samooborona—Ukrainian Popular Self-Defense, a name chosen to conceal its identity with the Volhynian forces) came into the open to fight the Communists.[57] As they had long had numerous scores to settle with the occupation authorities, the young warriors also began sporadic fighting with the Germans.[58] What is most interesting as an indication of the state of feeling in Galicia, however, is the speed with which Kovpak's group melted away

[54] MS D; Kovpak, map. It will be noted that, although a distinct shift in route was made, the deviation was not very great—perhaps twenty miles. One source maintains that Kovpak sent emissaries to the groups at Kremenets to propose cooperation or at least neutrality, but that while they refused, the largest ("Khrin's") numbered only two hundred, and so was quite incapable of attacking Kovpak's more than two thousand men (MS D).

[55] While the force left its swamp headquarters on June 12, it evidently did not enter western Polessia until about the twentieth and was deep in Galicia by July 9 (Kovpak, p. 109, and map).

[56] According to Kovpak the aim was the destruction of the oil fields around Ternopol', the second largest petroleum production center under German control (Kovpak, p. 107). While this is plausible enough, Ukrainian sources have always claimed that the aim of the expedition was disruption of the tranquility of Galicia, and especially interference with recruitment of Galician youths for the German armed forces. Probably the latter purpose occupied at least a secondary place in the minds of the Soviet leaders, since they would scarcely be willing to admit that it was necessary to send a partisan group which had been founded five hundred miles away in order to prevent their former subjects in Galicia from joining the "Fascist" forces.

[57] Lebed', p. 49.

[58] *Ibid.*; Report of "Dr. Frédéric" to Auswärtiges Amt, September 19, 1943, CXLVa 60, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 60); cf. Chapter VII, n. 25.

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in the unfavorable environment. When the raid on the oil fields failed, the group headed for the Carpathians. It is apparent even from Kovpak's own account that the powerful force disintegrated within a few weeks of its arrival there. In the latter part of August, Kovpak himself, with part of the band, headed north, reaching the swamp region on September 1 with about three hundred men. His second in command remained behind and was killed, apparently with the majority of the band.[59] Since the Carpathians contain at least as favorable terrain for guerrilla operations as does the Polessian area, where Kovpak's group maintained itself and even grew during months of heavy German attacks, it appears that a decisive factor in the rapid destruction of the band was the hostile attitude of the Galician population.

Kovpak's force had scarcely left Volhynia before the Bandera partisans began to seize control of the nationalist resistance movement. The failure of negotiations with Borovets' induced their commander, Dmytro Kliachkevs'kyi, to adopt the title UPA in an apparent effort to secure the prestige attached to it by "Bul'ba's" earlier start.[60] At the same time, the Bandera partisans regained the services of the most experienced of their commanders, Roman Shukevych, who had been the chief Ukrainian organizer in "Nachtigall." After the dissolution of Stets'ko's government, this unit had been withdrawn from the front, together with "Roland." Both detachments were thoroughly reorganized, certain nationalist members were arrested and the remainder sent as a detachment to fight Red partisans in White Russia.[61] When it appeared likely that the Germans would also suppress this anti-partisan unit, Shukevych escaped to Galicia, arriving in L'vov in the spring of 1943. There the Provid appointed him commander of all OUN-B partisan forces.[62] Moreover, the leaders decided that the refusal of Borovets' and the Mel'nyk forces to accept their proposals for union required forceful action to see that the nationalist partisan struggle did not degenerate into the private

[59] Kovpak, p. 124.
[60] See Chapter IV, n. 79.
[61] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 6; Lebed', p. 22.
[62] Interview 76.

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enterprises of numerous *otamans* or war lords, as had the Ukrainian movement in the last days of Petliura's regime.[63]

Consequently, on July 6, shortly after Kovpak had passed through the area, "Kruk's" force suddenly appeared fully armed before the Mel'nyk detachment of "Khrin" and demanded that it submit to Bandera command. Lack of preparation made resistance impossible; apparently, too, OUN-B propaganda had prepared the ground for the coup. At any rate, the majority of the Mel'nyk group accepted the ultimatum and enrolled in the Bandera force.[64]

Shortly afterwards, Iatseniuk's group was similarly compelled to join the rival forces.[65] After these incidents, the remaining Mel'nyk and independent groups rapidly melted away; they were destroyed by Communists or Bandera partisans, or joined the latter. In mid-August, "Bul'ba's" main force, which had also been seriously weakened, in part because of continued fights with Red partisans, was attacked by an OUN-B group. Two of his principal advisers from the UNR were captured and forced to join the OUN-B group; his wife was also taken prisoner.[66] He himself, together with Shtul', Mitrynga, Raievs'kyi, and other leaders, but with only a handful of fighting men, was driven eastward into Communist-infested territory. Here in November the group encountered a stronger Red force. In the resulting fight, Mitrynga and Raievs'kyi were killed, but Borovets' and Shtul' again managed to escape.[67] This time they took the only course which they felt remained open: they left Volhynia altogether, going to Warsaw to seek German assistance to rebuild their scattered forces.[68] Shcherbatiuk remained as commander of the tiny, demoralized group in Volhynia (which had been renamed the Ukraïns'ka Narodna Revoliutsiina Armiia—Ukrainian People's

[63] Lebed', pp. 41–43.

[64] Shuliak, p. 25; MS D; I. Hirniak, "Tse bulo 6. lypnia 1943. roku" (This was July 6, 1943), *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), July 1, 1951, p. 3. All three sources assert that numerous Mel'nyk adherents were executed by the OUN-B.

[65] Shuliak, p. 27.

[66] *Ibid.*; Hrytsenko in *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 14, 1951, p. 4.

[67] Interviews 50, 72.

[68] Lebed', pp. 41–43, confirms the general nature of these attacks on the "Bul'bist" groups, although he emphasizes their lack of organization and the "bloodless" nature of the OUN-B compulsion.

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Revolutionary Army—UNRA, to distinguish it from the Bandera usurpers of the original title).[69]

The rapid loss of strength of the Mel'nyk-Borovets' forces presents something of a puzzle. The explanation offered by the representatives of the latter is that they deliberately decided to refrain from entering into a fratricidal struggle. In part this appears to be correct. A major objective of both Borovets' and the Mel'nyk chiefs was to avoid creating a large-scale partisan organization, yet this is what would have been necessary to counter the Bandera group, which was bent on forming just such a powerful force. On the other hand, the assertion of adherents of the defeated party that the first attacks came unexpectedly, yet resulted in a complete surrender, itself implies that it was not calculated avoidance of an internecine struggle which alone led to the defeat. While the Bandera adherents were tightly organized, capable of sudden, prepared action, the other nationalist forces suffered from lack of central organization and competent leadership, since Borovets' was himself inadequately trained to conduct a campaign which required political as well as military experience and yet was unable to secure advice from a single, unified advisory body. Moreover, the very dynamism and *élan* of the Bandera party appear to have attracted popular support; in spite of the comparative lack of military ability of "Kruk," for example, he is said to have been more popular than "Khrin." No doubt, too, their program of mass uprising, while of doubtful wisdom, was, like all forthright action, appealing to active spirits. It is noteworthy that nearly all of the members of the other partisan groups, when compelled to join the OUN-B movement, did so without taking a favorable opportunity to desert. Ukrainians in general have frequently been in the unhappy position of having to choose the lesser evil, which was unquestionably the Bandera movement, ruthless as many of its adherents were. The main concern was to fight on against the alien occupiers.[70] A third factor was the geographical location of the opposing forces. The group under Borovets' occupied excellent terrain, but an

[69] Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 12.

[70] This feeling was expressed in a letter from Iatseniuk to Borovets' explaining that he accepted the OUN-B coercion only so that he could continue to fight against the Soviet and German forces (Interview 50).

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669 725 extremely exposed position, subjected to constant pressure by the Red partisans coming down from the northeast. Probably "Bul'ba" suffered as much altogether from attacks from them as he did at the hands of the Bandera partisans. The latter, on the other hand, occupied a somewhat more sheltered position in northern Volhynia and had a fairly clear line of communication to their large base in Galicia. Finally, the possession of the Galician source of manpower and leadership, very much larger than any outside source available to the rival groups, gave the OUN-B a decisive advantage, which had been consolidated by the early infiltration of the Volhynian police forces by Bandera organizers.

By fall of 1943 the Bandera group was in substantial control of the country districts of Volhynia and southwestern Polessia.[71] The Germans, of course, held the towns and with difficulty maintained movement on the principal roads, but it was even possible for OUN-B agents to penetrate the Reichskommissariat capital, Rovno, and to kill several of Koch's principal officials in broad daylight.[72] Such a large area east of Rovno was under full control of the insurgents that they set about constructing a "state" apparatus, including military training camps, hospitals, and a school system.[73] The total number of persons involved in the movement —including medical, administrative, and instructional personnel, as well as fighting men—was tens of thousands. Looked at in this fashion, the nationalist claim of a hundred thousand members of the UPA is perhaps not incredible, since a fairly trustworthy source describes one village in which the total personnel reached two thousand. Probably a German estimate of forty thousand (at the end of 1943) is more nearly accurate, however.[74] Included in the forces, according to nationalist accounts, were a number of non-Ukrainian elements—Jewish physicians and deserters from German police units recruited from prisoners of war representing many of the nations of the Soviet Union. The great weakness of the movement, however, was lack of trained officers. For a long time the Bandera partisans had been forced to use as chief of staff an elderly UNR officer ostensibly in command of a Rovno

[71] Occ E-4 (1).
[72] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, November 23, 1943, p. 3; Occ E-4 (1).
[73] Lebed', pp. 29–30.
[74] Occ E-4 (1).

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police regiment.[75] Each additional UNR officer from the "Bul'ba" forces, aging though he was, was a treasure who was given a post of great importance by his new masters.[76] Similarly, Soviet officers who escaped from prisoner camps or deserted from Red forces were eagerly welcomed. The lack of trained military personnel greatly limited the partisan organization's value as a fighting force.

The presence of many men who had lived under the Soviet system at first acted as a disturbing influence in the organization. The Bandera leadership, having carried the policy of one-party direction to a temporarily successful conclusion, was determined to maintain this position and to prevent the development of an East Ukrainian opposition, which they suspected was infected with Communist attitudes. Their instrument was the SB or Security Service, forged by Lebed' years previously. Though the extent of the "purges" of "unreliable elements" (primarily East Ukrainians, but including some former Mel'nyk partisans, although apparently no old UNR émigrés) is uncertain, there is little question that it was sufficiently great to arouse extreme disaffection among the non-OUN-B elements in the enlarged partisan movement.[77] At the same time, however, the East Ukrainian elements apparently had sufficient influence—or compelling arguments—to secure the adoption of a program calculated to secure support from former Soviet citizens.[78]

At the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN partisan forces on August 21–25, 1943, both Germany and the "Muscovite" Soviet Union were criticized as not really socialist or progressive, while a future national and social revolution or subjugated peoples was prophesied.[79] Greatest emphasis was still placed on armed struggle, rather than on social policy; but a long series of measures evidently calculated to broaden support among the East Ukrainians was proposed. They included destruction of

[75] MS D.

[76] E.g., Colonel Treiko and Colonel Lytvynenko, chief adviser from Andrew Livyts'kyi to Borovets'; MS D.

[77] Shuliak, p. 30; MS D.

[78] See report of a press conference of the UHVR by M. Stiranka in *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, October 11, 1947, p. 3.

[79] *Za samostiinu Ukraïnu: Boiovyi organ OUN* (For Ukrainian Independence: The Military Organ of the OUN) (clandestine), No. 9, December 10, 1943.

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deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917. The application of these laws was followed by violent repressions on the part of the Austro-German Army. Punitive expeditions against the peasants became very frequent and summary executions became general throughout the country. The hate of the peasant population was directed against the Austro-Germans and soon reached its peak. The soldiers of the armies of occupation no longer dared to go out after sunset, except in groups. Knives, directed by mysterious hands, frequently found the backs of Austro-German infantry men. The Civil War was in full blast. The Government, incapable of acting without looking for the support of the military forces of the invader, did not escape either hate or contempt and could only maintain itself until the complete reversal of the situation, which was not slow to come. The defeat of the German forces and the armistice forced the troops of occupation to leave Ukrainian territory. It is unnecessary to say that, hated by the popular masses, deprived of all support, and with a doubtful ideology of Ukrainian independence, the Hetman could not continue to govern. Also, as soon as the Austro-German forces began to retire, revolutionary propaganda began to flood the Ukrainian country-side. The former Ukrainian politicians, dismissed from their posts after the establishment of the Hetmanate, put themselves at the head of this movement and received, at first, the unconditional support of the peasants and even of certain military units of the Austro-Germany Army in which the Galician element predominated. Thus, led by Simon Petlioura, the peasants marched on Kiev in order to depose the Hetman. Received everywhere with enthusiasm, they had no difficulty in precipitating the retreat of the Austro-German troops, and rapidly occupied the greater part

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669 of Western Ukraine. On 14 December the Hetman had to flee from his capital, after having proclaimed, in an absolutely Platonic way and without achieving any concrete results, the re-incorporation of the Ukraine in Russia! At the same time the Soviet Government 726 annulled the peace of Brest-Litovsk and began troop movements, invading Northern Ukraine on their part. A third force, the White Volunteer Army and the Don Cossacks, also made their appearance on Ukrainian territory. These three forces fell upon the Ukraine and made her a battle-field.

Supported by the remainders of the Austro-Hungarian troops and supplied with war material abandoned by the retreating invaders, the forces of the Directorate (new name of the Ukrainian Provisional Government) seemed to be beginning to be in a privileged position. But the lack of officers, the bad administrative organization and, above all, the unpopularity of separatist Ukrainian ideas, tended to give success to the side of the Soviets, who were able to take control of the popular insurrectionary movement which had so far been in the hands of Petlioura. Soviet military historians, while recognizing the high qualities of the Russian counter-revolutionary army, note that among all the opponents of the Red Army the troops of the Directorate were distinguished by their low fighting effectiveness. On the other hand the rigid policy of General Denikine, chief of the Volunteer Army, prevented its union with the adherents of Petlioura, so as to form a single front against the Soviets. Thus the White General was fighting on two fronts, in the north against the Soviet troops and in the west against the Ukrainian troops. On their side the Ukrainians fought both against the Whites in the east and against the Reds in the north.

At the beginning of 1919 the Soviet offensive took

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727 by the troops of Petlioura. On their part the Soviet authorities took their vengeance in the towns and the country districts on hostages, in proceeding with mass executions of members of the middle classes, intellectuals, rich peasants, and clergy, while the Whites inaugurated the mass hanging of Communist leaders. The interval of the French occupation of Odessa, in April 1919, changed nothing in the situation. The second counter-offensive of the Soviets, followed by still more atrocious massacres, ended in putting the whole Ukraine under Soviet domination at the end of the winter of 1920. The Whites, under the command of General Wrangel, entrenched themselves on the Crimean peninsula. The troops of Petlioura were again driven back towards Poland. From this moment a new phase of the Civil War begins in the Ukraine. Guerrilla fighting, led by chiefs of Ukrainian bands such as Makhno, Kosak, and others, known under the name of the *bat'ki* (the fathers), began. They had important forces at their disposal. Under the cover of political ideologies (Makhno was anarchist, the others 'Communists without Jews,' etc.) they devastated the rear of the Soviet front. The personnel of these bands was undoubtedly of peasant extraction. They were mostly the remnants of the Army of Petlioura which had succeeded, after his defeat, in filtering to the rear of the Soviet front. Until a long time after the establishment of the Soviet regime, these bands menaced the communications and disorganized the life of the country. Full-scale military operations would have been required to deal with the *bat'ki*. The Ukraine did not easily submit to Bolshevism.

669 727

648 In 1920 a last attempt of foreign intervention in Ukrainian affairs was undertaken by Marshal Pilsudski.

The defeat of the Central Powers led to the unchaining of the eternal struggle between the Ukrainians and the

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661 Choumsky, and a group of his friends had opposed this policy of the Central Government. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine accused Choumsky himself of 'spiritual connection' with the counter-revolutionaries of the Polish Ukraine and especially with the U.N.D.O., the most important among the Ukrainian political parties in Galicia and working under Polish influence. At that period one still didn't shoot Soviet Ministers. But Choumsky was forced to leave the Ukraine and to accept a small administrative post in Moscow.

186 177 To regain the initiative in the Ukrainian question, the Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution in November 1927 directing the Communist Party in the Polish Ukraine to struggle resolutely for the separation of this country from Poland and for its re-inclusion in the Soviet Ukraine.

On the other hand the inauguration of the first five-year plan, which strengthened the economic ties between the Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union, and the creation of the Red Army on a basis of discipline and of modern military science, made the use of Russian necessary throughout the whole Soviet territory.

669 This pro-Russian tendency did not last long. The forced collectivization of the land, undertaken in execution of the five-year plan, turned the Ukrainian peasantry against the Soviet Government. This resistance soon changed into a kind of civil war and became underlined by hundreds of thousands of deportations, by thousands of executions, and by a terrible famine.[1]

The resistance to collectivization, which was incompatible with the spirit and the vital interests of the

[1] See the work of Calvin B. Hoover: *Economic Life in Soviet Russia*, M.R.S., Paris, 1934, in which many pages are given to the question of collectivization.

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peasant proprietors, was so violent and seemed so justified that it carried certain Communist circles of peasant extraction with it, and especially the former *borot'bistes* (Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries of the left) who had accepted the Soviet programme in 1917. A new and violent purification followed.

Fearing a connection between the discontent of the peasants, the opposition within the party, and the nationalist movement supported from abroad, the Soviet Government took Ukrainianism under its control in order to prevent its use by the opponents of collectivization as a weapon against the Soviet regime. This time Ukrainization was pushed to the extreme and was maintained by the huge apparatus of repression. In all the enterprises, and in workers' syndicates, special cells were formed for the propaganda of the Ukrainian language and for the rigorous control of the knowledge of Ukrainian, which had become the obligatory language, established by the officials. The number of Ukrainian teachers was increased, new Ukrainian theatres, clubs, and libraries were created in industrial centres. Russian newspapers were almost completely suppressed. Those who resisted Ukrainization were mercilessly expelled from the administration and everything was put under the direct control of a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars. To all the countless suppressions to which the Soviet citizens were subjected that of the Ukrainization was added.

The attempt to snatch Ukrainianism from the hands of circles socially opposed to the Soviet regime was not successful. A veritable nationalistic anti-Soviet propaganda spread everywhere, supported by the officials of the regime. Then came the second change of policy. Two trials, one of the 'Union for the Deliverance of the Ukraine' and the other of the 'National Centre'

interest that grew steadily and I am happy and proud, President, to 648
see that to-day this interest is not only personal, for, appointing me as its Representative, the Government of the French Republic approves my efforts and charges me to continue officially the excellent relations that have developed between us. I bring you the official assurance that France, which as the first country is undertaking this decisive step, will support with all her power the Ukrainian Republic in those endeavours she will undertake to continue to walk on that road the Allies had chosen, and on which they will march without hesitation, thoroughly conscious of their rigths and their duties towards the democracy of the whole world and of humanity... From this day forward France has entered into official relations with Ukraine".

The Government of Great Britain appointed likewise its representative to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic, Sir Picton Bagge. In his letter to the Ukrainian Government Sir Picton wrote:

"My Government has charged me to assure you of its best intentions. It will support with all its strength the Ukrainian Government in the task it will undertake in creating an efficient administration, securing order and fighting the Central Powers".

6. The War of Soviet Russia against Ukraine

In December 1917, the Russian Bolshevik organisations in Uk- 669●
raine, leaning on the Russian armed forces stationed in the Ukrainian cities, tried to overthrow the Government of the Ukrainian Central Council and to set up the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The Ukrainian Government disarmed the Russian armed forces and sent them over the boundaries of Ukraine. After this the Soviet Russian Government put to the Ukrainian Government an ultimatum to stop in Ukraine the disarming of Russian troops, which were friendly to Communist dictatorship, and to return the arms to the troops already disarmed.

"If after 48 hours no satisfactory reply will be given, the Council of the People's Commissars will consider the Ukrainian Central Council to be at war with the Government of the Soviets in Russia and Ukraine", so ended the ultimatum of the Russian Communist Government.

For fighting the Ukrainian Democratic Republic the Russian Soviet Government created its puppet 'Government of Soviet Ukraine'. This 'government' took up its residence in Kharkov, captured by troops sent from Russia. The Kharkov 'Ukrainian

● 641 Government' was window-dressing for the further advance of the Russian Communist troops in Ukraine.

At this time the Russian and Jewish Socialist parties in Ukraine issued protests against the attack of the Soviet Russian troops on the democratic Ukraine. In December 1917, a conference of the Russian Social-Democrat organisations in Ukraine (the so-called Mensheviks) in Kiev declared that it "brands with indignation the new infamous deed of the Bolshevik Government, that in its blunt fanaticism and irresponsibility came to declare war on Ukraine".

In the session of the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Councils of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies in Kiev on December 18, 1917, the delegate of the Jewish Social-Democrat 'Bund', Zolotarev, declared that "the Jewish proletariat will defend Ukraine together with the Ukrainian nation against the attack of the violators".

At the same Congress the leader of the Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Schatz, in his speech laid stress on the fact that "now in Russia only one organising force has remained — the Ukrainian democracy and its organ — the Central Council"

Ukraine refused to accept Soviet dictatorship and entered an unequal struggle with overwhelming Communist forces invading [642] from Russia. The Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic by a special Act (*'IV. Universal'*) of January 22, 1918. It is significant that even some Russian Communist organisations in Ukraine declared against the attack of Soviet Russia on Ukraine.

One of the commanders of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Communist Antonov-Ovseyenko, writes in his memoirs that in December 1917, the leader of the Communsit organisations in Kharkov demanded that he should not make war against the Ukrainian Government, with regard to the "special situation in Ukraine in connection with the national problem" (*Comments on the Civil War*, vol. I, p. 55). On this disposition of the Communists in Ukraine Antonov remarks:

"The local Communists are very irresolute, are looking for coalition with opportunists, do not want and do not try to give our troops any assistance" (*Comments on the Civil War*).

Another commander of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, Colonel Muravyev, wired Antonov from Odessa on February 21, 1918, about the disposition of the workers: "I do not want to carry responsibility for anything that is happening here, if the local Soviets do not want to defend the revolution, their own government" (Antonov, *Comments*, p. 169).

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

7. The Policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine in 1918

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The behaviour of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine was extremely hostile towards all that was Ukrainian. After the conquest of Kiev in February 1918, the Soviet commander Muravyev in his order Nr. 14 wrote: "We bring this government from the far North on the points of our bayonets, and where we set up our rule we support it with all means by the strength of these bayonets . . ."

In the Ukrainian capital Kiev, the Bolshevik troops made a terrible pogrom of all Ukrainian cultural institutions: Ukrainian books, the pictures of Ukrainian writers were destroyed: people who had documents written in Ukrainian were shot, etc. This policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine is attested by the statement of a Communist of Ukrainian origin, Vasyl Shakhray, who was in spring 1918, Commissar of War in the 'People's Secretariat' (this was the name of the Government of Soviet Ukraine appointed from Moscow):

"What a 'Ukrainian Government' is this whose members do not properly know and do not wish to know Ukrainian? . . . What a Ukrainian Minister of War am I, if I have to disarm all Ukrainian troops, for they do not want to go with me to defend the Soviet Government? We have only one military support in our fight with the Central Council — the army that was brought into Ukraine by Antonov, which regards all that is Ukrainian as hostile, counter-revolutionary" (*Annals of the Revolution*, No. 1, p. 162: Kharkov, 1928).

The campaign of the Russian Communists against Ukraine had not only political reasons: it was the desire of the Moscow Government to seize the food resources, grain, sugar and other agricultural products, and the natural resources of the Ukraine, iron ore, coal, etc. With the Communist 'Red Guards' the organisers of requisitions of food for Russia came to Ukraine. The commander of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, Antonov-Ovseyenko, wired to one of the Russian Commissars in charge of supply on January 23, 1918: "You must appoint your representatives for the Gubernias of Kharkov and Poltava . . . who shall conduct the requisitions of grain according to a fixed plan . . . leaning upon an armed force that has been appointed by Moscow and Petersburg for this front particularly". (*Comments on the Civil War*, vol. 1, p. 184).

The Soviet Russian troops exported from Ukraine to Russia everything they regarded as necessary in masses, even the machines and outfitting of factories. Of course, this pillage roused great discontent among the masses of the Ukrainian people. Even greater

669 indignation was caused by the bloody Communist terror that took thousands of innocent people as its victims. The war of Soviet Russia against Ukraine and the terror by the Russian 'Red Guards' in Ukraine, still strengthened among the Ukrainians the will to fight for their national independence. This was expressed in an essay by the President of the Ukrainian Central Council, Professor Hrushevsky, the most authoritative personality of Ukrainian political life of that time. Hrushevsky wrote:

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"The first matter I have to lay stress on is that from now, in our relations with Moscow, a radical change has taken place. It is vain to look for a possibility of living with the Russians in the boundaries of one state. We had sincerely believed that in a new Russia the Ukrainian nation could find the necessary conditions for its manifold development. Now we have lost this belief. We have convinced ourselves that our ways differ from those of a reactionary or a revolutionary Russia. After the unprecedented barbaric atrocities of the Russian Bolsheviks against the Ukrainian people, after the cruel shelling of the Ukrainian capital by the Soviet Russian troops, in our relations with Russia a new period begins. Ukraine has to continue her struggle for liberation in order to create an independent state. Our social and political ideals must be based not on the examples of oriental despotism, but on the principles of the life and development of civilised Europe, where, before all, human dignity is valued. Ukraine has always stood in her history culturally and politically nearer to Western Europe. If we want to liberate ourselves from foreign violence, we have to conform to the civilised West" (*On the Threshold of New Ukraine:* Kiev, 1918).

8. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

728 The Soviet Russian Government had by its ruthless propaganda for an immediate peace treaty definitely disorganised the front against the Central Powers. Thus the representatives of the Ukrainian Government took part in the peace negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. The diplomats of the Central Powers gave the Ukrainian Government in the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegates various facilities in order to secure a 'grain treaty' with Ukraine. For the food situation of the Central Powers at that time was fatal. The peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers was concluded in Brest-Litovsk on February 9. 1918. As at that time a great part of Ukraine was occupied by the Soviet Russian troops, it was in the interest of the Central Powers to interrupt the export of grain to Russia, and to use the food

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrainian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discontent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The representatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

structions that the government he formed had to stand entirely by the principle of a Ukrainian state, without any orientation towards Moscow or Poland". Nevertheless, Skoropadsky's Government consisted in its majority of Russians of reactionary trends who distinguished themselves by a hostile attitude towards the Ukrainian national movement.

The Ukrainian political parties had no confidence in the Skoropadsky régime, they considered it to be an outrage upon the Ukrainian national independence.

Against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austro-Hungarian troops which supported it, mass uprisings began in order to restore the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. Of course, the reaction in Ukraine was 'water to the mill' of Communist propaganda. Moscow knew how to use this situation for its advantage.

At the end of the summer of 1918, the members of the Skoropadsky Government prepared to restore 'indivisible Russia'. Skoropadsky issued an order on November 14, 1918, in which he stated that Ukraine "had the duty to fight first for the creation of an All-Russian Federation, the principal aim of which will be the restoration of Great Russia".

10. The Restoration of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1918) — The Government of the Directory

Against the federation of Ukraine with Russia proclaimed by Skoropadsky, and against the reactionary régime in general, the masses of the Ukrainian people arose under the leadership of the Directory, which was elected by the Ukrainian National League (15. 11. 1918). The Ukrainian National League was created by the Ukrainian democratic parties in summer 1918. The principal aim of the League was the struggle against the Russian reaction in Ukraine which prevailed there under Skoropadsky's rule. When the League received news on Skoropadsky's plans for the 'Federation' with the Russia of the White Generals, it began to prepare armed forces in due time. The National League and the Directory had as their members prominent leaders of the Ukrainian Central Council like V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlura, both members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, M. Shapoval, Socialist-Revolutionary, and others. Summoned by the Directory, hundreds of thousands of the Ukrainian population in cities and villages joined the uprising. Only in Kiev the Skoropadsky Government held out for some time, leaning upon small detachments of Russian Monarchists and the decisive support of the German troops. On

669 December 12, 1918 a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as [661] against 'Russian fdlowers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parliament and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian 668 National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians 186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vangiard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the 642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

726 régime and were at the same time threatened by the advance of the Russian armies — the 'Red' from the North and the 'White' from the South-East. But the Galician Ukrainians showed even under these unfavourable conditions a considerable talent for organisation, a high level of patriotism and sacrifice. Galician Ukraine weakened by four years of war, isolated from the outside world and alone, could without foreign help, defend herself for more than eight months against an enemy several times stronger (Poland), could organise efficient administration, and secure order and legality on her territory.

The Poles started a new offensive in May 1919 with the forces of General Haller's army which had been organised in France and sent to Poland for the defence against Soviet Russia. The Polish Government used this army against the Ukrainians. Against the fresh Polish forces the Ukrainians with their poor equipment could not stand and had to leave Galicia retreating to Eastern Ukraine.

12. Ukraine in Her Struggle against Soviet Russia in 1919

669 The revolution of the Ukrainian democrats against the Skoro-
726 padsky régime met from the very beginning with the irreconcilable enmity of the Russian Communists. It was well understood in Moscow that the reactionary Skoropadsky régime, in 1918, had weakened the Ukrainian national movement and brought confusion into the masses of the Ukrainian people. It was decided in Moscow to conquer Ukraine once more and for this reason an immense propaganda machine was set going. As soon as the Directory had declared the uprising against Skoropadsky, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party appointed a 'Provisional Workers' and Peasants 'Government of Ukraine'. This 'Government' had the task of making war against the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. In one of its first acts this 'Ukrainian Government' outlawed the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as 'enemies of the people'. Of the five members of this 'Ukrainian Soviet Government' only one, Zatonsky, knew Ukrainian, others were people completely strange to Ukraine.

Against the Soviet Russian troops who invaded Ukraine, the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic fought by military and political means. But the Communists were assisted at that time by the shortsighted policy of the Entente Governments. In December 1918, the French navy landed troops on the shores of the Black Sea to help the army of the Russian Volunteers under General Denikin in the fight for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia'. The appearance of foreign troops in Ukraine caused great

confusion among the masses of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainians who had overthrown the reactionary Skoropadsky Government installed by the Germans, looked at the French troops with great distrust, for they might renew the rule of the big landowners in Ukraine. In the meantime the policy of the leaders of the French Army in Ukraine was hostile to the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The attempts of the Ukrainian Government to come to an agreement with the French were fruitless. These negotiations produced only material for Communist propaganda, that the Ukrainian Government 'sold the interests of the Ukrainian nation to the Western imperialists'. The Communist propaganda spread among the Ukrainian Army too. The consequences of this propaganda were disastrous; Ukrainian soldiers deserted the front against the Russian Red Army and some detachments even went over to the side of the Soviet Army. *Thus the French intervention supported only the growth of Communist influence in Ukraine.*

The Government of Ukraine also made attempts to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government. But Moscow remained, as always, hostile to an independent democratic Ukraine and had only one aim — to take possession of the rich Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian Government, formed in December 1918, was headed by the Social-Democrat Volodymyr Chekhivsky. This Government consisted predominantly of Socialists and had also a representative of the Jewish Social-Democratic Party (Poale-Zion), A. Revutsky, as Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority. All that did not restrain Moscow from calling the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic 'capitalist'.

To the protests of the Ukrainian Government against the attack of the Russian Red Army on Ukraine the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied hypocritically: "The military actions on Ukrainian territory are a matter for the Army of the Directory and the Army of the Ukrainian Soviet Government which is entirely independent."

Against this statement the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in its wire of January 9, 1919, declared.

"The Directory sees clearly the aim of the Government of the People's Commissars; it wants to bring Ukraine, rich in grain, coal and other products, with the aid of the 'Bolshevik Soviets', under its rule and turn her into its colony."

Before the advance of the Russian Red Army the Ukrainian Government was forced to leave Kiev, its capital, at the beginning of February 1919. In Vinnitsa the Socialist members of the Directory quitted the Government. The member of the Directory

669 726 642 and Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, S. Petlura, Social-Democrat, retired from the Party. He was elected President of the Directory in place of Vynnychenko. A Government was formed without the participation of Socialists with Prof. Serhy Ostapenko as Premier. In Ukrainian political circles there was a hope that Ostapenko's 'bourgeois' Government might more easily succeed in coming to an agreement with the French Command in Odessa than a Socialist one. But these hopes failed. The French representatives offered the Ukrainians the choice to become a part of the front of the 'White' Russians against Bolshevism. They refused to discuss the national rights of Ukraine.

The disregard of the Ukrainian national movement revanged itself gravely in the fate of the Franco-Greek troops landing on the coast of the Black Sea. The parts of the Ukrainian Army which had joined the Soviets under the command of Hrihoriev and J. Tyutyunnyk, attacked the Franco-Greek landing forces. These detachments took, on March 1, 1919, Kherson, and on March, 15, Nikolayev, and in the first days of April, Odessa, forcing the French to embark. Thus, because of not fully understanding the Ukrainian problem, the French representatives, through their orientation towards 'White Russia', in spring 1919, helped actually Soviet Russia to occupy Ukrainian territory. By this they strengthened the hopes of the Russian Communists for 'world revolution'. Russian Communists thought that in Ukraine 'the fate of world revolution is being decided'; the title of a book published in 1919 in Moscow was *Where the Fate of World Revolution Is Being Decided.* From Ukraine the Soviet Russian Government planned to send aid through Rumania to the Hungarian Communists, who had proclaimed a Soviet Rupublic in Budapest on 21. 3. 1919. These plans of the Soviet Russian Government failed, for a that very time mass risings and the struggle of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic stopped the advance of the Soviet Russian troops to the West.

642 669 The Government of Ostapenko, without the participation of Socialists, called 'Cabinet of Agreement with the Entente', was replaced on April 9, 1919, by a new Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic composed of Socialists headed by the Social-Democrat Borys Martos. This Government announced its intention to depend on the own forces of the Ukrainian nation itself. At that time, when the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic remained in the Western provinces of Ukraine (Podolia, Volhynia, Galicia), in Central Ukraine, on the Dnieper River mass uprisings against the Russian Communists developed. Even groups of Ukrai-

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlichter said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919:

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'.

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of

669 the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine', gives testimony in a book published in 1920 under the title — *Struggle for the Liberation of the Village:*

From April 1, until May 1, 1919, there had been 93 risings against the Soviet Russian regiment in Ukraine; from May 1, until May 15, — 28 risings; from June 1, until June 19, — 207 revolts.

Thus, instead of a 'march on Europe', the Russian Communist army had to fight stubbornly with the masses of the Ukrainian people for the Ukrainian grain.

"Every Pud (36 lbs.) of the requisitioned grain was sprinkled with drops of blood", the Communist Commissar Schlichter wrote later on his supply activities in Ukraine in 1919. The risings in Ukraine happened under the banner of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had permanent contacts with them.

The Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, reorganised on Galician territory, started an offensive against the Communists at the end of May 1919. The Soviet Russian troops pressed by the Ukrainian Army, and under the blows of the Ukrainian partisans, were forced to retreat. Soon the Ukrainian Galician Army joined the fight against the Russian Communists.

14. The Polish Army Occupies Western Ukraine in 1919

726 The hundred thousand strong Ukrainian Galician Army fought against the forces of the whole of Poland from November 1918, until summer 1919. At the end of May 1919, the Rumanians who had seized Bukovina on November 11, 1918, occupied Southern Galicia. On June 25, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente passed the following resolution regarding Galician Ukraine:

"In order to protect the persons and the property of the peaceable population of Eastern Galicia against the dangers it is threatened with by the Bolshevik gangs, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to authorise the forces of the Polish Republic to go on in their military operations as far as the Zbrucz River"*).

Under the pressure of the Polish Army several times stronger than the Ukrainians the latter were forced to leave the territory of Galicia and went over on the territory of Eastern Ukraine. The Polish-Ukrainian war ceased, and between the armies of both states a demarcation line was drawn. However, the Polish Government used every opportunity to extend its occupation over other Ukrai-

*) The former Russo-Austrian frontier.

nian territories. This Polish policy held the Ukrainian military forces that were fighting against the Russian Red Army constantly in tension, and hindered the work of the Ukrainian Government. 726

The Ukrainian Galician Army took part in the struggle against the Soviet Russian occupation immediately after the termination of the war with the Poles. The Galician Ukrainians wanted to strengthen the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper, together with the forces of Eastern Ukraine, in order to decide later the historic quarrel for Galicia with Poland.

15. Ukraine between 'Red' and 'White' Russia (1919)

In June 1919, the Ukrainian Government, headed by the Social-Democrat Martos (from August Isaac Mazepa, Social-Democrat, was Prime Minister), took up its residence in Kamenets in Podolia. The united Ukrainian Armies were under the command of General Yunakiw, former Professor of the Military Academy in Petersburg. The Government of Ukraine made efforts to secure legality and order in its territory, particularly it resolutely fought the excesses of various dark elements against the Jewish population. In the Government of theUkrainian Democratic Republic there was a special Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority — Pinkhos Krasny (Jewish People's Party); the deputy Minister of Labour was the Jewish Social-Democrat Prof. Salomon Goldelman. 642 563

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Bolshevism as well as the entire Ukrainian problem were in 1919 unknown to the world. Against the Ukrainian liberation movement Communist propaganda was made throughout the world, trying to describe the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as a reactionary state. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Russian 'Whites' and of the Poles permeated decisive political circles abroad resulting in the conviction that the Ukrainian movement was the same as Russian Bolshevism. Therefore the Ukrainian Republic which had led a heroic struggle against Soviet Russia was blockaded by the Western Great Powers as 'infected by Bolshevism'. Because of this blockade the Ukrainian Army was in want of arms, supplies, medicaments. Only by contraband from Rumania was it possible to receive something for the Ukrainian armed forces. Under these circumstances it happened frequently that the Ukrainian Army fought with arms captured on the front from the enemy. But in spite of all these difficulties the united Army of the Ukrainian Republic had considerable successes in the battles with the Soviet Russian troops and, on August 31, 1919, took Kiev, the capital of 669 ● [105]

669 Ukraine. The 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' headed by Rakovsky left Ukraine and was abolished by order of Lenin. This was a new proof of the complete failure of the Russian Communist policy in Ukraine.

But at the same time the Ukrainian Republic met a new enemy who had claims on Ukraine. This was the Russian Volunteer Army under Denikin. The leaders of this army regarded the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as more dangerous for themselves than the Soviet dictatorship in Moscow. Therefore, in its struggle against the Russian 'Red Army', the Russian 'White Army' attempted before all to take possession of the Ukrainian territory in order to [648] prevent the strengthening of 'Ukrainian separatism'. In vain the Ukrainian Government appealed to the Western Great Powers that they should not admit the attack by the Russian Volunteer Forces on the Ukrainian Army and that they recognise the Government of democratic Ukraine. If in 1919 the Government and Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been given the least support by the Western Powers, the development of Eastern Europe and even the whole world would have taken another course than happened in fact. In any case, by securing an independent Ukraine, Russian imperialism would not be such a menace to the world as we see it to-day.

[731] When Denikin's troops met the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev they attacked Ukrainian armed forces weakened by the struggle with the Russian Red Army and decimated by a disastrous typhus epidemic. This epidemic had spread principally in consequence of the blockade of the territory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army had no medicaments, no clothing nor sanitary equipment, the Ukrainian soldiers died in thousands, and there was no help. From the army the epidemic spread among the population of Ukraine.

[727] But even under these incredibly hard conditions the Army of the Ukrainian Republic and the masses of Ukrainian people did not abandon the fight against the new oppressors — the Russian Volunteers — who had abundant support from the Entente Powers. The Russian 'Whites' forbade the Ukrainian language in schools, offices and the press in the Ukrainian territory they had seized. Russian authorities ordered the burning of Ukrainian books. The Denikin Government cruelly persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Even the word 'Ukraine' was forbidden; the expression 'Little Russia' was used instead. The Denikin Government restored the estates of the big landowners in Ukraine.

Against the Denikin régime in Ukraine extensive risings of the

people took place. The Ukrainian Government and Army were forced under the pressure of Denikin to leave the temporary capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the city of Kamenets in Podolia, on November 15, 1919. The Ukrainian Army marched into the hinterland of the enemy. The enormous partisan movement in Ukraine in autumn 1919, stopped Denikin's offensive on Moscow. Of this the Russian Red Army took advantage, broke through the front of Denikin and marched into Ukraine again. The front of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, brought into disorder by the war with Denikin, could not be restored at once, and the Soviet Russian troops seized almost the entire territory of Ukraine again.

When the leaders of the Russian Volunteers saw the coming of their definite defeat, they offered the command of the Ukrainian Army which was carrying on a partisan war against the oppressors of Ukraine, an alliance against the Russian Communists. The delegate of the Russian Volunteer Army, Colonel Popov, wrote in January, 1920, to the Ukrainian Supreme Command: "We have what you want — arms, but you have that we have not — the confidence of the population". The Ukrainians declined this offer of the Russian 'Whites' convinced that any alliance with them would bring only damage to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

The Army of the Ukrainian Republic began its 'Winter-Campaign', famous in the history of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, in Lubar in Volhynia on December 6, 1919. This army, by order of its Government, made partisan war on the territories of Ukraine against 'White' and 'Red' Russia until May 5, 1920. Only leaning upon the confidence and the active support of the population could this army cover distances of thousands of miles carrying the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of equipment did not allow the Army of the 'Winter Campaign' to accept in its ranks many thousands of Ukrainians who wished to fight actively for the independent Ukraine.

16. The New Tactics of the Russian Communists in Ukraine

The failure of the Soviet Russian policy in Ukraine in 1919 caused much discussion among the Communists themselves. By order from Moscow, in October 1919, not only the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine', headed by Rakovsky, was abolished, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Among the Communists who had worked in Ukraine in 1919 a group of the so-called federalists appeared that demanded from Moscow more rights for Ukraine. The leader of this group,

656 G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state
186 and not a Russian colony.
668 The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Communists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population.

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic . . . We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against

the Ukrainian partisan movement. New requisitions of grain and the taking of arms from the population caused an even greater disappointment among the Ukrainians. The partisan movement which had overthrown Denikin's power turned with new vigour against the Russian Communists. These risings were carried on under the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of arms and supplies did not permit the Ukrainian partisan movement to develop and to attain decisive results in the struggle with the overwhelming forces of the Russian Red Army.

17. Poland — Ukraine — Russia 1920—21

At the end of 1919, the regular front of the Ukrainian Army broke down. The Ukrainian Army continued the fight against 'White' and 'Red' Russia as guerilla war. The diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic headed by Andriy Liwycky, Cabinet member, started negotiations with the Polish Government about the relations between Poland and Ukraine. The consequence of these negotiations was a Convention signed in Warsaw on April 21, 1920. In that time the Government of the Ukrainian Republic headed by Isaac Mazepa was remaining in Ukraine.

According to this Convention a new frontier between Ukraine and Poland was established: those Ukrainian territories Poland had seized in 1919 in the war with the Ukrainians (Galicia, Volhynia etc.) remained on the Polish side. The Polish Government undertook to support the restoration of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on the territories occupied by Soviet Russia.

The war of Poland and Ukraine against Soviet Russia, which was carried on with changing fortunes did not bring the expected results to the Ukrainians. The Polish leaders thought it more advantageous for themselves to come to an agreement with Soviet Russia after having divided the Ukrainian territories with Moscow (Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921). Poland recognised in Riga the Government of the 'independent' Soviet Ukraine and broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army which in fighting against the overwhelming Russian forces, had entered Polish territories together with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1920) was interned. The soldiers of this army, who had fought against Soviet Russia not only for Ukraine but for Poland alike, were placed by the Polish Government in camps in such conditions that many of them died there, or acquired serious diseases.

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this election system the representatives of the peasants, the most numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During 1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrainian partisan movement was spreading. At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. *(Collection of Reports).* In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Russian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

which was led by General Kornilov, later by Denikin. In the summer of 1918 the Kuban Region fell into the hands of the Russian Volunteer Army. The leaders of this army wished to make the Kuban Region a base for the restoration of Tsarist Russia. Among the population of the Kuban Region and in the State Council a strong opposition to the Russian Volunteers arose. But Russian influence was stronger: under the pressure of Denikin's army an alliance of the Cossack territories — the Don, Kuban and Terek regions — for the fight against the Russian Communists was formed at the end of 1918. Against those Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks who defended their independence the Russian Volunteers used terroristic methods: President of the Kuban State Council Mykola Ryabovol was murdered in June 1919 in Rostov, prominent members of the State Council were arrested and hanged. This terror by the Russian 'Whites' was the reason that the Kuban Cossacks left the front against the Russian Red Army and repealed the alliance with the Russian Volunteers. At the beginning of 1920 the Kuban State Council according to the will of the population took the Government of the Kuban into its hands. Vasyl Ivanys was appointed Premier. The Kuban leaders wished to get rid of the protectorate of the Russian Volunteers and to continue the struggle against the Soviet Russian Army in alliance with Ukraine and the peoples of the Caucasus. But in April 1920, under pressure of the Soviet Russian Army, the Kuban Government was forced to leave its territory and to move to Crimea, where at that time the Volunteers' Army of General Wrangel was. Being pressed between two forces, both of which fought for domination in Russia, the 'Red' and the 'White' Russians, the Ukrainian Kuban Government could not attain any agreement with them and went abroad.

The Kuban Region was occupied by the Russian Red Army. Soviet Russia refused recognition of the Ukrainian nationality in the Kuban Region for a long time, and carried on a Russification line through the school and press. Only on August 30, 1929, the Commissariat of Education in Moscow decided that the literary language of the Ukrainians inside the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Republic was the language of Ukraine.

But even after this the Russian Communist bureaucracy hindered the development of schools among the Ukrainians in the RSFSR. In December 1933, in the Kuban Region and on other territories of the RSFSR, with a Ukrainian population of 7 millions, all Ukrainian schools, press etc. were abolished by order from Moscow. During the collectivisation and the famine of 1932—33 the population of the Kuban Region had enormous losses. Attempts on a rising

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 Government refused to recognize the decisions of the
642 Rada, and thereby strengthened a group of separatists hitherto supported only by the second Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress (June 7). The Rada now issued (June 24) a *Universale*, proclaiming that henceforth the Ukrainian Rada would control Ukrainian affairs and work in federation with the All-Russian Parliament when this should be established; and on June 30 an executive body of the Rada, called the General Secretariat, was appointed.

This step caused anxiety to the Petrograd Government; and on July 12–14 two members of the Duma, Tereschenko and Tseretelli, and subsequently Kerenski, went to Kiev. While granting most of the Ukrainian demands, Kerenski opposed the demand for the formation of a Ukrainian army on the ground that it would mean the break-up of the Russian army. The favourable attitude adopted by Kerenski towards Ukrainian demands caused a split in the Provisional Government of Petrograd; and the Cadets left the Cabinet on July 16.

[669] The reorganized Provisional Government decided to grant autonomy to the Ukraine, but on July 19 a social revolution broke out in Kiev, and the help of the Provisional Government was sought by the Rada for the restoration of order. But before the formal recognition of Ukrainian autonomy by the Provisional Government, which took place on August 17, other riots broke out in Kiev, this time among the Russian or russified town population, who protested against the 'ukrainization' of South Russia. The recognition of the Provisional Government meant that, until the summoning of the Constituent Assembly, the General Secretariat of the Ukraine was the recognized authority controlling finance, commerce, industry, agriculture, labour, and other domestic affairs. All measures had to be submitted to the Provisional Government. The Ukraine was to consist of the Governments of Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava, and Chernigov; the other Governments mentioned above could be included if

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

strife, inspired such desperate acts as burning stores of grain, and aroused Socialist protests in the Austrian Reichsrat. Meanwhile the Moscow Soviet Government came to an agreement with the Ukrainian Rada (May 23), and recognized the Ukraine as an independent state. On June 13–14 the Russo-Ukrainian armistice was formally signed.

On May 24 a peasant rising broke out all over the Ukraine owing to the drastic measures of the German military officials, who declared the country in a state of siege; the rising was directed against the Germans and the big landowners, who regarded the German army as militia to be used against social disturbances and anarchy. The objects of this rising were stated in the manifesto of the Peasants' Congress at Kiev on June 7. The congress demanded (1) that a Hetman chosen by landowners should be deposed; (2) that the Ukraine should be a 'People's Republic'; (3) that no land should be returned to proprietors; and (4) that a Legislative Assembly should be convoked. This assembly the peasants agreed to support, appealing to the Germans not to oppose the People's Republic. However, the German troops in occupation continued to suppress strife among the peasants and to collect food by severe means, the result being that Von Eichhorn was assassinated in Kiev on July 30.

The Ukraine now became the battleground of five propagandist forces—pro-German, pro-Ally, pro-Russian Federalist, Bolshevik, and Separatist-Nationalist. The Austrian authorities arranged for the evacuation of Lvov by the Polish troops, and the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) seized the city (October 31) and held it for about a month, during which they are said to have had the help of the Ukrainians from Volhynia as well as of the Austrian officers. The Ukrainian (Ruthenian) National Council stated that it had taken over the administration of Eastern Galicia. The Polish Galician Liquidation Commission, established after the retirement of the Austrian authorities, opposed the Ukrainian claims.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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(c) *The Ukraine since the Armistice.*—The government of Skoropadski lasted for a short time after the signing of the armistice in Western Europe; and the conservative elements in the Ukraine, whether Ukrainians, Poles, or Russians, wished that the Western Allies should support Skoropadski and send a fresh army of occupation to replace the German army. Hoping for an Allied recognition, and under pressure from the peasants, Skoropadski introduced some democratic reforms, and dissolved the Germanophil cabinet of Lyssogub. The old Rada, however, reorganized itself into a Directory with Vinnitchenko and Petlura at its head, and replaced Skoropadski's government on December 14, 1918.

241 It is almost unbelievable that in many regions of the steppe the planted surface is not ploughed up, or in any case only superficially with a land-parer. The purpose is to conserve soil moisture. Often the entire sowing, the entire spring work of the farmer consists of a single process. A light land-parer scratches the surface; it has a box attached to it containing the seed, and the harrow is attached to this "ploughing and sowing machine". With this type of sowing one necessarily reaps a lot of weeds.

243 438 Nevertheless, before the war the Ukraine enjoyed the reputation of being a granary. During the years 1909 to 1913 the country produced on an average of 8.6 million more tons of grain annually than it consumed. The annual export amounted to /144/ an average of 4.3 million tons of wheat alone and 2.7 million tons of barley. (87) Surplus and export dropped considerably

87. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 390.

under Bolshevik rule. In 1934 only one million tons of grain were exported.

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425 669 In 1917, when the Bolsheviks became active, the general feeling in North and Central Ukraine was extremely favorable to an agrarian revolution. The land-hungry peasants were deeply convinced of the fact that the "right of the landowner was an injustice". Whoever promised the peasants that they were to receive all the land they could themselves cultivate, had won them over to his cause. As a matter of fact, in 1917, at the beginning of the revolution, the lands of the estate owners and the large farmers were immediately divided up, in the process of which the estates often went up in flames and

425 669 the cattle were burned. However, the glorious state did not last long. The farmers lacked seed, machines and draft animals in order to cultivate the land they so easily obtained. Besides, the men who came back from the war and the landless village farmers wanted to have a share in the booty. In the guberniyas of Kiyev and Khar'kov the government claimed the forests and the extensive beet fields. Civil wars, drought and epidemics carried off hundreds of thousands of peasant families during the years of the Bolshevist war. Thus ended the first chapter of the agrarian revolution, so eagerly awaited.

423 241 The New Economic Policy with its tolerance of a "bludgeoned private economy" constituted the second chapter. The peasants obtained their land and their farms on long leases; they could cultivate their land as they pleased, except that the farm could not be carelessly run, otherwise the management of the establishment could pass over into other hands. Nothing was gained by the fact that all the land belonged to the community. The "communal fields" were a Russian form of possession which had found favor at the time of Catherine II in the steppes and in the part of the Ukraine on the left bank of the river. Even though the farmer could not dispose of his land 497 at any time like a free /Facing page 144/ /Map IX: Railroad Communications. The main lines of communication run in a north-south direction, whereas the east-west lines have always been neglected./ /Key: Number of daily passenger trains in 1935./ /145/ estate owner, even though he was 423 241 obliged to acquiesce to the fact that the entire community property was redistributed every 10 to 20 years, nevertheless, he could do as he pleased on his section of land. No less than 88.9% of peasant land in the Ukrainian steppes belonged to the communities, and in North Ukraine, 80.4%. The czars had condoned this form of ownership, because it simplified administration, facilitated

186 of the seventeenth century, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. The Kremlin, like Hitler, had no intention of satisfying the essence of Ukrainian national aspirations; all it wanted was to secure a greater degree of Ukrainian co-operation in the war effort, in guerilla fighting and sabotage behind the enemy lines. The Soviet Government could not prevent its war-time emergency measures from being misunderstood and mistaken for some sort of *carte blanche* for future nationalistic deviations.

• 469 The full extent to which Ukrainian nationalists may have betrayed the Soviet Union during the war with Germany is, of course, impossible [57] to estimate. The Ukrainian Soviet Government indirectly recognized, however, that the militant anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists must have constituted a fairly considerable body by proclaiming an amnesty in 1944 for the members of the U.P.A., the 'Ukrainian Insurgent Army'. This amnesty is unique in the history of the U.S.S.R. since it applied collectively to an entire group notable for its fanatical hatred of the Soviet régime and its contempt for the Russians.

This amnesty offer was so unusual for Soviet conditions that many U.P.A. members refused to take it seriously. The U.P.A. continued to terrorize the Soviet Ukrainian-Polish-Czechoslovak border areas, and in 1945–47 carried out daring raids deep into Czech and Polish territories. The members of the U.P.A. detachments were often referred to as 'Banderovtsy' after their leader Stephen Bandera.

[728] The 'Banderovtsy' exploited for their ends the fact that a comparatively small strip of land in Eastern Poland which was inhabited by Ukrainians was not included in the Ukrainian S.S.R., the area of Kholm and Hrubeshov. According to the nationalities programme of the Comintern the Kholm area was to be included in the Soviet Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian State President, M. S. Grechukha, in a Supreme Soviet debate on February 7th, 1944, also demanded the incorporation of this 'Ukrainian Far West' into the Ukrainian S.S.R.[18] However, the Soviet central Government apparently found it impossible to convince the Western Allies and even the Polish communists that another slice of Poland should be cut off. Thus the Ukraine was denied its 'Far West' and a repatriation of the Ukrainians of the Polish areas concerned was carried out instead.

The activities of the 'Banderovtsy' found particular support among the peasants of the Ukrainian villages of the Polish border area earmarked for evacuation; for one of the foremost tasks of the U.P.A. detachments was to render the evacuation impossible and to prevent by terrorist acts any Polish colonization on former Ukrainian farmland. It has been asserted that the Banderovtsy enjoyed support from local Ukrainian Soviet authorities in the border areas because of their anti-Polish character. This allegation is difficult to check. It is certain, however, that the U.P.A. detachments could not possibly have maintained themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrainian peasantry.